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Still other times, the ‘book’ has felt more like a performance piece, something in which 
the act of doing both equaled and surpassed the notion of a single moment in which a 
piece is ‘completed’…the conceptual became the ‘real’ through an applied process which 
itself was invisible. 
 
 
- Lucy Grealy, in a letter to Ann Patchett 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Every disease is a work of art/if you play it rightly. 
- Gwyneth Lewis, Angel of Healing 
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In English, the root “dis-” is often treated like a mask; remove it, and a perfectly 
legible word still exists underneath. The disempowered are only ever three letters away 
from empowerment, and disembodiment may be resolved with the flick of a syllable; 
language, like life, can appear to be a world of black and white that may be categorized 
and therefore comprehended. However, behind these clean lines, are the in-betweens—
the monstrous “harbingers of category crisis” (Cohen 6) who remind us that 
disgruntlement does not modify “gruntlement,” and that no “tort” exists that can then be 
distorted. Disability is a word that is expected to encompass a wide range of physical and 
mental experiences; however, it is not the opposite of ability, despite its semantic stance 
as such. Ability exists on a spectrum: one may be equally debilitated by depression as by 
a car accident, though only one is socially recognized as disability. “English is not a very 
flexible language in terms of the body” (Albright 86), but it forms the basis for our social 
categories; and despite the fact that it describes rather than invents, it can influence 
perception to the point where “our experience of a Chagall painting actually depends to 
some extent on whether our language has a word for blue” (LA Times qtd. in Morrison 
323). It stands to reason, then, that our treatment of disability is influenced—disabled, 
even (Kuppers 58)—by the word: it separates the reality of lived experience into a binary 
in order to make it decipherable. But are we underestimating our capacity to read 
different languages? 
A couple of years ago, I attended a performance of Heidi Latsky’s GIMP project, 
a mixed-ability dance performance that explored issues of connection and communication 
between bodies of radically different abilities. At the time, I was astonished by a show 
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unlike anything I had ever seen; and like many observers of physically disabled dancers, I 
articulated my experience with the language of mystique and awe. Did you see her? She 
had no legs, but looked taller than anyone I’ve ever seen!  
At the onset of this project, I expected GIMP to be one of my primary sources; 
however, the more literature I read on the topic of disability and its intersection with 
dance, the more curious I became about Latsky’s choreographic tactics. Can she, for 
example, effectively represent the experiences of those living with disabilities when she 
has never identified as disabled? This question cropped up in my personal experience as 
well; on numerous occasions, my peers asked why I was interested in studying 
disability—as if it were a category isolated from the realm of normal inquiry, one that I 
surely could not be interested in without personal, physical impetus. Though I could not 
pinpoint it at the time, I could only say that there was some reason—some force driving 
my project—that led me to question why, as a nondisabled person, I was not expected to 
regret the absence of disability studies from my undergraduate college discourse. I had 
been considering issues of ability since I began my classical ballet training, a world that I 
devoted a decade of my life to pursuing. During this time, issues surrounding body image 
were prevalent enough that it was normal for dancers to periodically crumple into heaps 
on the floor, unable to move; if that is not a disabling experience, what is? What defines 
disability, and who gets to decide? 
In Monster Culture: Seven Theses, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen offers a way of reading 
cultures through what they hold to be monstrous. Whether they are vampires and 
werewolves, or—as the American media currently suggests, fear of aging, and bodily 
imperfection—“monsters are the embodiment of a cultural moment” (Cohen 4). While I 
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do not wish to suggest that the disabled body is monstrous, I believe that its position as 
the representation of corporeal Otherness—of a body that has rebelled against its host, 
reminding those around it of the same potential disruption—makes it an ideal lens for 
accessing and exposing some of the fears currently at the heart of American culture. 
Disabled bodies are at once “incoherent”—understood to be the opposite of abled— and 
yet are also undeniably same; they are what Cohen calls “disturbing hybrids…a form 
suspended between forms that threatens to smash distinctions” (6).  
This grey area is what allows for the “propensity to shift” (Cohen 5), for the 
monster to perform different versions of itself until it can no longer be categorized—
making it more difficult for an audience to understand, and therefore judge. Though 
Cohen’s argument does not concentrate on disability, Monster Theory provides 
interesting groundwork for viewing the disabled body, particularly in its performance of 
identity: considering that our “fear of the monster is really a type of desire” (Cohen 16), 
what prompts us to disown it? If "the same creatures who terrify and interdict can evoke 
potent escapist fantasies" (Cohen 17), what relevance does this have for the historic place 
of racial, sexual, and bodily Otherness in dance, which has long been celebrated as a 
medium for voyeurism? Finally, what forums allow for supposed ‘creatures’ of Otherness 
to become creators—who “attract the gaze,” and then “show it those sights which will 
brutalize, horrify, repulse, or shame it” (Pafunda 314)? 
Despite its connection to theories surrounding racial and sexual Otherness, 
historically, disability has itself been Othered by these categories. Perhaps because it is 
“the most unstable designation of them all” (Bérubé qtd. in Samuels 65), the study of 
disability as an identity category did not gather momentum until the past two decades—
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and even now, it is rarely given due emphasis in academic discourse, despite the fact that 
disabled people make up the largest minority in the United States (Crutchfield & Epstein, 
14). What accounts for this gap? According to Samuels, “the disabled body is a 
nightmare for the fashionable discourse of theory because that discourse has been limited 
by the very predilection of the dominant, ableist culture” (Samuels 68). Even Judith 
Butler, whose theories of performativity and the appropriation of gender give voice to 
marginal discursive subjects, takes a stance that assumes her own position as a woman 
who can “walk, talk, give birth, see, and be seen” (Samuels 65). While Gender Trouble 
and Bodies that Matter paved the way for disability theorists to apply concepts of parody 
and performativity to their studies—notably Robert McRuer with Crip Theory, an 
examination of disability and queerness—any careless application of one identity 
category to another necessarily undermines the specificity of both. 
As Cohen suggests, another reason that disability has been consistently bypassed 
is the fact that because it is a hybrid, its definition is slippery; perhaps part of the 
motivation behind the semantic strictness of disability was the hope that if it can be 
contained “linguistically and theoretically, then the society would do that as well” 
(Linton 115). If they are not given a name, they must not exist. However, the reality of 
the bodies lurking behind that label represents an avalanche of potential energy that may 
at any moment break loose and override organized notions of acceptability. Attempts 
have been made in recent years to come up with an accurate prototype for studying 
disability; one example is the British “Social Model of Disability,” attributed to Mike 
Oliver in 1983. In this model, which grew from the “hard-line, male-dominated, and 
determined” (Shakespeare 198) Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation 
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(UPIAS), disability is understood to be distinguished from impairment: the former is a 
social construction, and the latter is rooted in the physical. This model, which sees 
“disability as something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are 
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society” (Shakespeare 198), 
places the burden on society to remove the barriers—physical and theoretical—that 
prevent disabled people from accessing public spaces. At its best, the model seeks to 
remove pressure from disabled people themselves and to unite them in a collective force 
that is empowered, worthy, and mad as hell.  
However, as Tom Shakespeare points out, the model contains critical flaws. For 
one, it was developed by a small group of largely white, heterosexual men, most of whom 
had injured spinal cords. This homogeneity contributed to the Social Model’s lack of 
range; not only does it gloss over less visible disabilities, it runs the risk of implying that 
impairment may be alleviated by political mobilization—when oftentimes, the physical 
aspect of disability is unable to be ignored, even for a second. It assumes that the solution 
lies in removing environmental barriers in order to accommodate every disability, despite 
the impossibility—and oftentimes, undesirability—of that goal; leading to Shakespeare’s 
claim that the model “is a blunt instrument for explaining and combating the social 
exclusion that disabled people face, and the complexity of our needs” (202). If physical 
spaces may not be altered to fit every need, perhaps the solution lies in the less tangible 
spheres—art, dance, literature—that can bend not only to accommodate, but also to 
celebrate each individual rung on the ladder of ability.  
While significant progress has been made in disability studies, and the body of 
literature on integrated arts is growing, the field contains critical limitations that do not 
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allow for a full understanding to be reached. Disability is not simply a “minority issue,” a 
problem for only a select few: as Irving Zola states, “disability is a universal experience 
of humanity” (qtd. in Shakespeare 203). It has historically been partitioned from other 
identity categories because, according to Shakespeare, sexual and racial differences do 
not impede the body from functioning; but disability is “difficult to recuperate as a 
concept, as it refers either to limitation and incapacity, or else to oppression and 
exclusion, or else to both” (Shakespeare 202). What we have, then, is an issue of 
perception; more so than any bodily malfunction, the societal portrayal of disability as a 
“lack” is in need of rehabilitation. In this thesis, I argue that giving voice and expression 
to the disabled experience can do this by restoring authority to the individual experiences 
that reframe the able-bodied advantage as one with “losses as well as gains to be 
contemplated” (Linton 69). I believe that the same mediums that define disability—
language and physical ability—are also the means for its release: not only separately, but 
together. Writing—specifically life writing—and Contact Improvisation, a postmodern 
dance form, articulate disability with new vocabularies, reframing its position in society 
and allowing the complexity that Shakespeare bemoans as missing to materialize to its 
fullest.  
My experience with GIMP broadened my interest in how bodily truths are 
articulated, and led me to seek out the forums that facilitate that effort. On the one hand, I 
chose to focus on dance because—of all the physical arts—it is the most notoriously 
concerned with bodily perfection, and therefore provides a keyhole for investigating 
when, and how, non-normative bodily experiences are depicted. I began to research the 
field of physically integrated dance in an effort to pinpoint what is working, and 
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significantly, what is not; but of all the dance forms I investigated, I believe that only one 
captures the unpredictable, dialogical nature of illness and disability in a way that is true 
to life. Contact Improvisation (CI) allows for freedom, and a breaching of boundaries, 
that traditional narrative-bound dance does not. By its very nature, CI is spontaneous; it 
has no formal aesthetic to cling to, and thus is malleable—similar to contemporary life 
writing, which has “proved remarkably flexible in adapting to new voices and assuming 
new shapes” (Smith & Watson 109).1 Unlike traditional plot-bound autobiography, and 
unlike outsider perspectives that often feature the spirit overcoming the “broken” body,2 
life writing allows for the subject to revise the cultural tropes that plague disability. This 
freedom is even more significant for women with disabilities, because it displays the 
contradictions within feminist arguments that posit “rugged individualis[m]” (Ferris 91) 
as the only means of independence. Not only are these female bodies dependent on 
others, they remind us that we all are at some point—presenting a truth that makes many 
readers uncomfortable. This discomfort, however, is where the power lies: it allows for a 
renegotiation of expectations and ideals, so long as the medium grants it space to move.  
While CI and life writing have been theorized in relation to disability, I am 
looking at them together: as two parts to a necessary whole. On a structural level, the two 
mirror each other in ways that connect to the physical experience of being disabled: they 
are capricious, disorderly, and not easily definable. Furthermore, because the reality of 
                                                        
1
 Life writing, as opposed to traditional autobiography, refers to the act of writing the 
events of one’s life in a creative, often non-sequential, manner. See Smith and Watson 
(2001) for distinction between life writing, creative nonfiction, memoir, etc. 
2
 “The disabled poets who seem to get the most attention often write about their disability 
while asserting that disability does not define them—a rhetorical tack that fits squarely 
into the ‘overcoming overachiever’ disability stereotype so reassuring to the nondisabled 
population”(Ferris 91). 
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being disabled is one that affects the body and the brain—equally, interchangeably, 
together—a more comprehensive picture is gained when that experience is examined 
through two lenses that are themselves intensely physical and emotional. Doing so 
reveals the false separation of those categories, and blends the intellectual and physical in 
a way that is significant for revaluing disability’s place in society. While dance is often 
considered a physical feat, CI engages the brain and spirit in a way that makes it uniquely 
qualified to uncover, and alleviate, bodily and emotional stress. Its bridging of mind and 
body is especially crucial in the context of disability, which often encourages a separation 
of the dysfunctional part from the rest of the whole; in CI, the physical interaction is 
always determined by the emotional state of both participants. It is a “dance of our entire 
being” (Pallant 100). 
Additionally, though writing is often considered to be restricted to the intellectual 
realm, it takes a physical body to be able to write; and the nuance of corporeality often 
reveals itself in literary tics, breaths, momentum, and structure. While disability may 
limit a writer’s ability to move through the world, its manifestations are not always 
negative; Larry Eigner, an acclaimed poet with Cerebral Palsy, made a career out of 
writing only what he could see while looking out his window. Likewise, in CI, 
participants are often instructed to move as though one limb is paralyzed, or to shut off 
their vision: these restrictions are valued, not rejected.  
Granted, there are countless autobiographies—particularly in the flexible realm of 
life writing—that capture the vulnerabilities and complexities inherent in living in any 
body, not just a disabled one. However, the reason for my interest in life writing and 
dance by women with disabilities is the fact that, by their very presence, these creations 
 13
combat the absence of disability from mainstream art. Their stories, and the unique way 
that they are told, bring readers face-to-face with deep-seated cultural fears of bodily 
Otherness: they claim space in a culture that does not always make room for bodies that 
do not fit the “ideal” mold. Even though disability is not always the main subject, it 
“cannot help but have an impact on the artistic production of people so marked” (Ferris 
91)—and the specific aesthetic of disabled bodies in motion, whether on the page or on 
the stage, gives voice to a marginalized population and urges reconsideration of what is 
deemed beautiful.  
 One of the primary issues with existing models for theorizing disability is the 
difficulty of identifying the locus of the disorder: if it originates in physical impairment, 
how much is each condition exacerbated by social discrimination? Shakespeare asks: 
If a person with MS is depressed, how easy is it to make a causal separation 
between the effect of the impairment itself; her reaction to having an impairment; 
her reaction to being oppressed and excluded on the basis of having an 
impairment; [and] other, unrelated reasons for her to be depressed? (201).  
 
In Contact Improvisation, the subject is granted the freedom to distinguish between these 
states; and when she is not able to, her relationship with her partner—one of weight 
sharing and listening—often reveals the origin. In life writing, a similar flexibility of 
structure gives the writer agency to distinguish between disease and dis-ease, if such a 
boundary even exists—because oftentimes, it is more blurred than not.  
In keeping with this lack of easy categorization, I aim to demonstrate that dancing 
and writing may not be so easily located as physical or emotional activities; and in order 
to demonstrate the impossibility of any binaristic definition of disability, have chosen to 
take an interdisciplinary approach to the topic. I look first at written text in order to 
demonstrate that language, a medium that marginalizes disabled bodies, may be 
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appropriated and used as a source of empowerment; and then point to the limitations of 
language in order to argue that dance—while historically unaccommodating toward 
bodily difference—is the more revelatory form of communication. Rather than restrict 
my research to texts that explicitly theorize disability, I have expanded my search to 
reflect its social construction—meaning, “everyone, in a sense, is disabled because we 
are all disabled by something” (DiPietra 273). I do not wish this to undermine the specific 
experience of living with severe physical and mental impairments; however, by 
broadening my argument to examine issues of dis-ease and body image, I aim to 
encourage a reconsideration of the way ability and access affect everyone—regardless of 
the little blue sign that hangs in the front of some cars, and not in others.  
In chapter one, I examine Plaintext, a collection of essays by Nancy Mairs. I 
emphasize the way in which Mairs uses the sporadic nature of essaying to reflect her 
complicated—and oft changing—relationship to her body, and to depict the 
unpredictability of living with disease. As poet Cynthia Hogue writes in “In A Mute 
Season,” “the phenomenology of pain/harbors words which refuse/syntax and order, 
predictable/eventual inevitability” (Hogue 311); and Mairs, whose disjointed text is 
anything but Plain, treats each essay as an opportunity to deny any linear “inevitability” 
within her ending, happy or otherwise. In chapter two, I discuss Autobiography of a Face, 
a critically acclaimed memoir by the late poet Lucy Grealy. Face traces Grealy’s journey 
through Ewing’s Sarcoma—a rare form of cancer—and even more significantly, the 
turmoil surrounding the largely unsuccessful reconstructive surgeries that followed her 
diagnosis. I address the ways that Grealy, with particular emphasis on expectations of 
beauty in the United States, explores the conflicts that occur when the face—the part of 
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her body that she equates with attractiveness—is constantly changing. I draw on the 
irregularity of her appearance, and the various roles that she takes on throughout her life, 
to undermine the idea of any singular self in life writing and otherwise: the lines between 
perspectives, and people, often touch. 
Finally, in chapter three, I use my research into the field of mixed-ability dance 
companies to highlight Contact Improvisation as a site for altering the role of disability in 
mainstream dance. Rejecting the typical confinements of formal performance, ideal 
bodies, and classical aesthetic, CI presents an opportunity for everyone—regardless of 
ability—to engage in an activity that is as therapeutic as it is artistic. Structurally, CI 
parallels the work of Mairs and Grealy in its denial of linearity; and like the texts, 
challenges the typical mind/body dichotomy by denying that either one is more 
“crippling.” While I expand on the history and relevance of CI in chapter three, I 
introduce it in chapter one as a lens for analyzing Mairs’s complex relationship to touch, 
physical and otherwise. CI provides a tangible, visible answer to the question of origin; 
but rather than identify one site of disability, demonstrates how issues of the mind and 
body to lead to one another in a mutually informative, endless cycle. Far from being 
perfect, CI is not a light at the end of the tunnel—instead, like Simi Linton, it is “more 
interested in finding a way out of the tunnel, doing away with tunnels” (Linton 62). 
If the past is a perpetually changing, volatile entity from which we are always 
traveling, then we must move in order to capture it. As sociologist Ken Plummer says, 
“[storytellers] even and more complexly can perform their stories—not just in words and 
scripts but as emotionally charged bodies in action” (Plummer qtd. in Smith & Watson 
74). In representations of disability—a term that, from this point forward, I will 
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periodically refer to as dis/ability in order to heighten the interrelatedness of both 
states3—the narrative cannot be removed from the ailment; just as Grealy proposes “there 
is also no way to disentangle the physical from the thinking mind or writerly 
consciousness” (Mintz 52). In this thesis, I argue that life writing and Contact Improv—
blank stages for the performance of endlessly changing identities—enable the perpetual 
change and uncertainty inherent in disability and chronic illness to be expressed in a way 
that is sensitive to the spectrum of individual experience. Rather than treated separately, 
they must be viewed as two parts of an interlocking whole. In the place of “dis-,” I argue 
for “re-”: renewal, re-visitation, and cultural revision of dis/ability as a subject that brings 
each and every one of us in closer contact with our embodied selves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Nancy Mairs: Plaintext 
 
When I walk, I aim to get somewhere. If my meters are sprung, if my feet are 
uneven, if my path is irregular, that’s just how I walk. And how I write. 
-Jim Ferris, “The Enjambed Body” 
 
 
                                                        
3
 See Roberts and Swadener, Semiotics and Dis/Ability: Interrogating Categories of 
Difference (2001). 
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 Perhaps some people are born knowing they were put on this earth in order to 
save it. Perhaps they, the lucky ones, even know what tool they intend to use: sword, 
brain, legs, or inky pen to blank piece of paper. Perhaps the latter, the writer, really does 
wake up on the morning of his or her “happily ever after” to find that the light remains 
golden across the land: no “hysterical weeping” (Mairs 91) from the princess, no ellipsis 
tugging on the tail of the neat ending. Nancy Mairs, a born writer, admits that she 
“love[s] closure enough to pretend that quick resolution lies among the length of a cell” 
(91)—however, by the time she begins writing her own story, she has lived long enough 
to know that “the true texts are the ones that do not end but revolve and reflect and spin 
out new constellations of meaning day after day, page after page” (92). Mairs may have 
known that her destiny was to write, but it took half a lifetime—and a handful of 
unanticipated self-identifications—for her to “look at the contents” of her life “squarely” 
(85) enough to reflect upon them. By the time it occurs, she is no longer simply Nancy or 
even Nancy the writer: she is a woman, mother, wife, depressive, and—most notably—a 
self-named “cripple” (9). 
After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, the erratic nature of her illness 
influenced both the content and structure of her writing: her prose reflects the jolted 
nature of her changed movement, a point I will return to later. However, whether or not 
Mairs’s disability is the focus of her writing, it is treated equally—and often, as the 
“logical concomitant”—to the rest of her being, including that which is more 
“immobilizing” (Mairs 13) than the disease itself. In Plaintext, a collection of essays, 
Mairs dips in and out of her variety of roles with the brazenness of a memoirist and the 
fluidity of a dancer, drawing structural parallels to the spontaneous role-shifting innate in 
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Contact Improvisation. Mairs inserts deliberate rhetoric into the structural disjointedness 
of essay writing, revising her life into one that denies any simplistic ending—meanwhile, 
filling in a crucial gap in the argument presented by some postmodern feminists. Mairs 
revises the gap, but also, revisions it: and by asking the reader to fill in the blanks left 
open by her “blurry right eye” (11), confronting her own fear of human touch, we are 
engaged in a dialogue that ends with a responsibility to alter the way we view disability. 
 
Rhetoric, Reliability, and Power 
 Nancy Mairs is not afraid to write about her body; on the contrary, she declares 
that she “couldn’t write bodiless prose…no body, no voice; no voice, no body” (Mairs 
qtd. in Mintz 23). While not every Plaintext essay deals explicitly with issues of 
embodiment, Mairs’s struggle to understand her “troubled” (Mairs qtd. in Mintz 40) 
body—both before and after her diagnosis—influences her writing at all levels. She 
unabashedly posits “her self as inextricably enmeshed” with the realities of her physical 
and mental state, thus “recall[ing] intellect to the body” in a way that author Suzanna 
Mintz recognizes as imperative (40). In Unruly Bodies: Life Writing by Women with 
Disabilities, Mintz asserts that “woman does, in the very act of telling her own story, 
enter a political arena by asserting the legitimacy of her participation in a domain until 
quite recently dominated by the res gestae narratives of men” (Mintz 9)—even more so 
when she is disabled, and belongs to a group typically excluded from the mainstream 
cultural presentation of femaleness. “Advertisers…deny the existence of me and my 
kind,” explains Mairs, so “viewers won’t feel threatened by her or his own physical 
vulnerability” (Mairs qtd. in Mintz 35). Therefore, it stands to reason that an entire text 
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devoted to one person’s experience of disability —unapologetically drawing attention to 
its difference, yet also insisting on its undeniable sameness—will splinter delusions of 
“normalcy” (Mairs 24). Finally in possession of the “tools” that will allow her to “smash 
the entire hideous alien structure wide open” (141), Mairs does just that, utilizing 
everything down to the structure of her prose. 
 She begins by leveling the playing field, giving the majority of her essays an 
identical first name: On. She writes “On” the topic of “Being a Cripple,” “On Touching 
By Accident,” “On Having Adventures,” “On Living Behind Bars,” and more. Right off 
the bat, the reader understands that each of these aspects of Mairs’s existence will be 
given equal weight; they are individual pieces of the patchwork life she intends to relay, 
of which being “a cripple” is only one. She chooses this identifying word—“cripple”—
deliberately, telling the reader that “it describes [her] condition: I have lost the full use of 
my limbs” (Mairs 10). At age twenty-eight—after being misdiagnosed with a brain 
tumor—Mairs was told she had multiple sclerosis, a degenerative disease that targets the 
communication between nerves in the brain and spinal cord. While she states that every 
story she tells will be necessarily colored by her identification as a “cripple,” she 
intentionally picks that word because it narrows the scope of “disability” down from a 
term that “suggests any incapacity, physical or mental” (10). Because of a long history 
battling with depression, which she also considers to be disabling, Mairs semantically 
partitions her disease from the rest of her identity—using the word most likely to render 
uncomfortable a society “no readier to accept crippledness than to accept death, war, sex, 
sweat, or wrinkles” (10). “Perhaps I want them to wince” (9), she tells us—us, not them. 
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But where do they end, and where do we begin? Does she trust the reader, or does she 
want us to flinch as well? 
 In a text full of narrative twists and counter-clockwise turns, Mairs pulls the rug 
out from underneath her reader with the elegance of Houdini. Right after describing the 
“gift” (11) that has been the ten years following her phantom brain tumor, and relishing 
the domestic rituals that—though hardly the adventures she used to crave—fulfill the 
adapted “terms” (7) of her life as a cripple, she amends her tone: “Lest I begin to sound 
like Pollyanna, however, let me say that I don’t like having MS. I hate it” (12). Later, 
Mairs interrupts the description of a family vacation—much in the way that the 
unpredictability of her disease interrupts her day-to-day routine—to describe the 
“exacerbation” (19) that prevented her from enjoying it. These rapid mood-changes are 
not incidental: as soon as we begin to indulge in the warm and fuzzy feelings of 
emotional triumph and strength of spirit that often dominate writing about disability, 
Mairs forces us to realize her disease’s deep ambivalence. She knows that “God doesn’t 
give bonus points for a limp” (20), and refuses to write a memoir that will feed into the 
common desire for a happy ending. 
 After a few essays, it becomes clear that Mairs is toying with the reader’s 
emotions for much more than theatrical effect. In addition to her insistence on the 
moment-by-moment ambivalence of MS, she posits herself as an unreliable narrator who 
deliberately contradicts and revises her own statements over the course of one anecdote. 
First, she forges a critical distance: in “On Not Liking Sex,” she establishes that she is “so 
old now” (Mairs 85)—and will be reflecting upon her previous experiences with the 
sense of removal that only time allows. The essay is a revisal of an earlier piece on the 
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topic of sex, and Mairs uses it as a forum to undo virtually everything that she established 
in the previous text. “I wrote the truth when I said that I’d fallen in love with only two 
lovers in my life,” she tells us, “though I can’t think now who I had in mind…Quod 
scripsi, scripsi” (87). Later, in “On Living Behind Bars,” she begins the essay by 
revealing, “in truth, the windows and doors were not barred” (125)—but the image suits 
her description of the “space that encloses” her (153). She attributes the “gaps and 
lapses” in her narrative to the fact that “[her] brain was zapped twenty-one times” (125) 
during her stint in a mental hospital—and by unapologetically taking the space to revise 
her feelings about the past, to literally rewrite her personal history, she allows readers to 
consider our own histories while still adopting a level of initiative in interpreting hers. 
Chances are, we pick up on a truth that Mairs herself may not have even realized while 
writing; as Mintz puts it, “she grants us the authorship of our own going along” (Mintz 
46).  
 
The Structure of Illness: Humor and Hindsight 
Her game of cat-and-mouse in relaying—and re-relaying—the truth may leave us 
disoriented and even a little bit embarrassed, but that is not what concerns Mairs. 
Multiple sclerosis is an incurable disease that is “unpredictable and uncontrollable” 
(Mairs 11), and in keeping with that truth, Mairs refuses to provide a “progress-narrative 
of classic autobiographical prose,” and instead “evokes the open-ended corporeal reality” 
(Mintz 27) of living with her disease. In the place of linear chronology, fierce 
individuality, and a unified identity, all ideals of a classical type of autobiography, Mairs 
turns to essay writing: a form that, in its disjointedness, encompasses the instability of her 
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experience. “The essay provides a counternarrative,” Mintz explains, that evokes “a more 
realistically ambivalent effort to occupy a body that offers both pleasure and despair” 
(32). In Plaintext, this ambivalence is highlighted through a voice that—in addition to 
periodically correcting itself—interrupts the story’s timeline; self-reflexive and unafraid, 
it expresses the “paradox of chronic conditions” (Mintz 27) that render a body both 
permanently ill and temporarily stable. In “On Living Behind Bars,” Mairs establishes 
distance from her pre-collegiate expectation that “as future moves through present into 
past, one revises the raw material into an orderly whole…” (Mairs 131). Instead, she 
expresses her lifelong negotiation of the “knotty confluence and contradictions between 
disability, gender, and sexuality” in a form of “inventive narrative shaping” (Mintz 18) as 
disorderly as the life experiences themselves. A typical narrative structure, complete with 
a neat little bow of happily ever after tying off the end, would be untrue to Mairs’s 
physical reality. She tells readers, “I can’t be sure of the outcome, as the terminally ill 
cancer patient can” (Mairs 18). And though the realization of that fact throws us off-
balance, neither can we.   
For each moment that we find ourselves flat on our backs after having the 
narrative jerked out from underneath our feet, Mairs herself is experiencing a similar 
unpredictability of body and mind; and in the freedom of her own life writing, chooses to 
approach it with humor: 
I pulled the door open I fell over backward, landing fully clothed on the toilet 
seat with my legs splayed in front of me: the old beetle-on-its back routine. 
Saturday afternoon, the building deserted, I was free to laugh aloud as I 
wriggled back to my feet, my voice bouncing off the yellowish tiles from all 
directions. (Mairs 9) 
 
In reminding us that the building was “deserted,” Mairs suggests that she granted herself 
permission to make light of her situation because she was alone; had others been there, 
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she might not have been willing to laugh out loud. This type of vocalization, found here 
in an empty bathroom, is also found in life-writing: in contrast with the type of negative-
reflection that occurs when Mairs internalizes the looks and expectations of those 
observing her body, memoir provides a forum for uninhibited reflection—a chance to 
hear one’s voice “bouncing off” (Mairs 9) the parameters of experience. Even though her 
essays were written with a future audience in mind, Mairs treats them as solitary 
activities in which she is free to posit her disability however she chooses. As 
demonstrated above, she often employs humor in this endeavor: never losing sight of the 
“maddening and sometimes painful” (13) aspect of her disease, she emphasizes that 
“almost every pickle that [she] get[s] into…is funny as well” (13). For a reader who may 
have spent a lifetime swallowing the mainstream societal standard of normalcy, a rule 
contingent on codified binary, Mairs’s statements come as a radical blurring of the 
boundaries: the disabled body can be a source of humor as well as anguish. 
 While she never indulges in a story of emotional triumph, never moderating the 
disabled experience in order to make it easier for her reader to digest, Mairs deliberately 
de-stigmatizes disability by tackling it head on. Just as she uses the abstraction of essay 
writing to interrupt herself mid-anecdote and bounce around the timeline of her life, she 
describes the physical interruption of MS in a lighthearted way. Even though the resulting 
injuries were decidedly “not funny” and in fact very painful, when she “thinks of [her] 
friend talking earnestly to the hot thin air” while her legs buckled beneath her and she 
“dropped from his view as though through a trap door,” she declares the image to be “as 
silly as something from a Marx Brothers movie” (Mairs 13). Though sporadic, this type 
of comedy reinforces the significance of the genre in which she writes: life writing, 
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intensely personal and a safety net for self-effacing humor. No story can be offensive to 
the author, no matter how embarrassing its content, because it is disclosed with 
permission and the authority of his or her own voice. In Mairs’s case, life writing 
provides for more accuracy as well; even though she chooses the word “cripple” to best 
describe the reality of her condition, she maintains that she would “never refer to another 
person as a cripple” (10). Therefore, if someone other than she were to attempt to capture 
her life on paper, there is no telling what politically correct—and in Mairs’s opinion, 
erroneous—jargon would be inserted in place of her truth. “Only the life narrator knows 
the experience of traffic rushing toward her,” and is the only one qualified to “make an 
interpretation of that situation, that is, write her subjectivity” (Smith & Watson 5).  
 Because she is the one telling her story, Mairs has the last word—and the first, for 
that matter—on its emotional pitch. While watching a television show attempting to 
depict disability, she is shocked at the way “her” body is portrayed, and remarks, “I 
couldn’t believe anything but an inchworm could make progress humping along like that” 
(Mairs 17). In stark contrast, however, the freedom of her own life writing is an 
opportunity to present her disability however she chooses. Just as an outsider might be 
too nervous to call Mairs a “cripple” even though it is the description she believes to be 
most accurate, someone living without disability might not be brave enough to flip it on 
its head: 
If every human being formed patches of plaque in his or her central nervous 
system, then I would not have multiple sclerosis; I would be normal and 
those without sclerotic spots…would be aberrant. (Mairs 141) 
 
Imagining a world where everyone has MS, Mairs “rename[s] ‘people who lack 
disabilities as the nondisabled’” (Mintz 36), because in comparison to herself, “they are 
the deficient ones” (36). In doing so, she demonstrates how subjective our categories are 
 25
in the first place; and she proves the capacity of language to completely reframe our 
conception of disability, “whatever its corporeal realities” (46).   
 Words contain power, and Mairs uses the act of writing as a forum for positive 
reflection. This is not to say that her meditations on her life are always cheery: quite the 
opposite. However, in the act of looking back on her experiences, Mairs is able to “look 
at the contents squarely” and “give tongue to the grammar” (Mairs 85) of their 
happening. As already mentioned, she felt compelled to write from a very young age, but 
it was not until Mairs was middle-aged—living with multiple sclerosis and having 
survived multiple suicide attempts—that she was willing to unpack the contents of her 
life onto paper. Cushioned by time and experience, Mairs tells the reader, and herself, 
that she finally understands: “I am a locus, not a terminus, of language, and what speaks 
to me can also be spoken and, through utterance, transformed” (123, emphasis mine). 
The act of speaking about her experiences, in all their complexity, goes beyond being an 
outlet for Mairs—even though she reveals that the “mandate” of writing is the only thing 
keeping her from “trying to kill [her]self” (104). By using language as the medium 
through which she fights expectations, the same structure that attempts to suppress 
Otherness, Mairs brings all linguistic binaries into crisis: engaging in the purposeful 
repetition that Judith Butler believes to be a key form of liberation.  
 
Judith Butler: Performativity and Repetition 
 Mairs’s humor does more than just disarm her audience: it forces reconsideration 
of the solemn stigmatization of disability. When she paints her MS in a specific way, she 
engages in what Butler calls “parodic repetition” (Butler 200): a process that, by putting 
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the portrayal of “the rules that govern intelligible identity” (198) in the hands of the 
person who breaks them, draws attention to the artificiality of the “real” (200). Butler, an 
American philosopher who specializes in issues of embodiment and sexuality, is well 
known for using the idea of “performativity” in relation to representations of gender and 
self. Though she has been criticized for leaving the dichotomy of dis/ability out of her 
conversation, many disability theorists have appropriated her ideas relating to why 
society shames bodies appearing to be “abnormal.”4 Just as the existence of a disabled 
body is crucial for the reinforcement of an able one, Butler explains that “binary 
opposition is a strategic move within a set of signifying practices” that “pits the ‘I’ 
against an ‘Other’ and, once that separation is effected, creates an artificial set of 
questions about the knowability and recoverability of that Other” (197). The existence of 
a deviant body provides the framework for an ideal one to be naturalized—without it, 
there would be no “normal” for “generative political structures” (Butler 201) to attempt 
to set in stone. Although she is referring specifically to the binary between sexualities, 
Butler’s solution for defying this construction is applicable to the dis/abled body as well. 
According to Butler, the “signification” that legitimizes categories of acceptability 
is reinforced by its repetition in culture. Rather than subvert this repetition, Butler 
suggests that it is through this process itself—moreover, the “possibility of a variation on 
that repetition” (198)—that the lack of any original, untouched self is realized. Like 
Mairs’s intentionally comedic descriptions, the “parodic repetition” (Butler 200) of 
aberrance—for Mairs, her MS—draws attention to the fact that “the original, the 
authentic, and the real…are themselves...effects” (200). As Mairs does through the 
                                                        
4
 Samuels suggests Corker 1999; Price and Shildrick 1999a; Sandahl 1999; Stocker 2001; 
McRuer 2006 for further research (61). 
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physical act of writing, Butler suggests that we can “redescribe” (203) the binaries that 
are presented as factual by “participating in precisely those practices of repetition that 
constitute identity” (201). Similar to the way that Mairs uses language—the same edifice 
that threatens to reduce her with its cruel oversimplification—Butler asserts that 
presenting a “dissonant and denaturalized performance” on the body, the site of 
controversy, “reveals the performative status of the natural itself” (200). In his speech on 
“Disability and the Aesthetics of Human Disqualification,” Tobin Siebers claims that 
“normalcy” is brought into crisis when the stereotypes surrounding it are intentionally 
repeated. When the bodies performing the tropes of normalcy are the same ones who 
typically suffer at the hands of such stereotypes, a power shift occurs. Suddenly, the joke 
is no longer on them—it is on anyone who continues to believe in one definition of 
ability, or of personhood itself.   
As I previously mentioned, Butler has been interrogated for leaving disability out 
of her discussion on Bodies that Matter, even though her theory is in some ways “the 
most easily adapted” to modern disability studies (Samuels 59). Ellen Samuels explains 
this snub as characteristic of the topic—disability is not yet recognized in the same space 
as race, sexuality, and other identity-categories (58).5 Where other theorists often use the 
relevance of Butler’s argument to justify their own ideas on the cultural significance of 
disability, Samuels points out the dilemma in doing so: “What meaning, or intention, is 
lost through the wholesale adaptation of Butler’s theoretical framework inflected only by 
a mere substitution of terms?” (64). She declares that inserting “able-bodiedness” or 
“disability” where Butler originally used “heterosexuality” and “homosexuality” runs the 
                                                        
5  “Critical Divides: Judith Butler’s Body Theory and the Question of Disability.” (2002). 
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risk of glossing over both categories for the worse. According to Samuels, who examines 
the work of essayist Julia Cho to prove her point, the careless layering of the disabled 
body onto the gendered body leaves the latter “realized,” while the “disabled body 
remains a reflective trope” (63). The only way to combat this imprecision, then, is to 
return the discussion of disability to those living with it: the life writers, like Mairs, who 
cannot help but grant the experience specificity. Mairs does not simply reduce her 
disabled body to a variation on a sexual one, she grants equal weight to each aspect of her 
identity. Just as Butler claims that “language sustains the body” because it erects the 
“matrices” that attempt to keep deviant bodies in check (qtd. in Samuels 67, 73), 
language also has the power—when put in the hands of those seeking to sustain it in a 
positive way—to rewrite history. In the context of life writing, language enables women 
with disabilities to take a stand on their own experiences—whether or not they can 
physically stand. 
 
Authority and Multiplicity of Identity 
One of the ways that Mairs keeps her life on her own “terms” (Mairs 18) is to 
acknowledge the way her self-perception will change over her lifetime, depending on the 
role she happens to be adopting. As previously mentioned, Mairs considers “disease” to 
be “simply one element of the continually revisable relation of a life” (Mintz 46): while 
she cannot separate her story from the way MS has altered it, disease is only one element 
in the “patchwork” (36) that makes up who she is. Just as Plaintext is structured as a 
collection of individual essays, each contributing to the whole but refusing to be gelled 
into a chronological path, Mairs represents herself as a similar collection of identities: 
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woman, mother, wife, professor, depressive, cripple, and self—past, present, and future. 
The freedom of writing allows Mairs to defy temporal linearity and shift between the 
various versions of her being, even describing her periods of depression—times when she 
feels most locked inside her head—with the removal of someone looking outward, 
accounting for the needs and wishes of “Future Nancy” (Mairs 18). By removing herself 
from one moment of her identity long enough to address the various aspects of her true 
“self,” she proves that she feels powerful enough to navigate between them.  
By showing us that there is no such thing as a singular, cohesive self, Mairs 
establishes that “the ‘truth’ of the body or the self is endlessly interpretable” (Mintz 
36)—and interpret she does. When she falls in love with a fellow inmate at a mental 
hospital, she declares that together they “played: two irresponsible loonies in a legally 
drugged haze” (Mairs 137, emphasis mine). Juxtaposed with her declaration that she has 
“been in terrible trouble, [but] never been insane” (127), we are led to the conclusion that 
each of Mairs’s characters is acted out—and that she has enough control over them to 
demarcate what she is and is not. “I may be a cripple,” she tells us, “but I’m only 
occasionally a loony and never a saint” (20). By clarifying the laws of propriety—for 
example, that “cripples must bear their lot meekly and cheerfully. A grumpy cripple isn’t 
playing by the rules”—we understand how masterful it is for her to then defy them, and 
play “Caliban, a most scurvy monster” instead of the more palatable “Tiny Tim” (Mairs 
15). Like Butler, Mairs believes that to act is to engage in the purposeful repetition of a 
sign that carries with it a “multiplicity of meanings”—and in her writing, she weeds 
through “their implications, their resonances” (81). Mairs does more than just live her 
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roles as they occur; she purposefully performs each and every one of them, whether in 
keeping with her disability or any of the other identities she embodies.  
This act of performance, of performativity, sheds new light on Butler’s argument. 
In the space of her prose, Mairs is able to “step back” and “watch [her]self as though 
upon a stage” (Mairs 17): she indicates that she has a choice in selecting the different 
personas that make up her being, that she can be “sulky if I want, or blithe; 
temperamental or gay or pensive” (143). In her writings on embodiment and the 
performance of identity, Butler suggests such authority in regards to gender: someone 
whose phenotype hovers at the border of recognition may choose between male and 
female identities. This same power has not traditionally been allotted to disabled bodies, 
because it is assumed that physical incapacity exists out of the subject’s control; for 
example, a paraplegic cannot stand up and choose to perform able-bodiedness. However, 
someone like Mairs—whose disease is not always readily identifiable—represents a 
critical fissure in this assumption. Depending on the day, Mairs’s MS might either be 
completely obvious or entirely invisible, mocking onlookers in its “intransigence” (Mairs 
20). Flexing her authorial control, Mairs claims that this blurriness “defeats” doctors who 
“think of themselves as healers”; though she is often infuriated by her disease, she is “not 
diminished by it—and they are…I incarnate the limitation of their powers” (20). Here, 
Mairs takes on a brand new identity: medical kryptonite. Whether she is anguished during 
bouts of depression or using her MS to subvert power hierarchies, Mairs is always at the 
helm of her life story. By the time she lists her seemingly mundane activities—“child-
rearing, editing, writing, teaching” and taunts us by asking, “What real harm could I do?” 
(Mairs 149), we already know the answer: as much as she chooses to. 
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  One of the most pervasive aspects of Butler’s argument is her assertion that there 
is no authentic self: identity is constructed, and one may perform heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, and everything in between. Both disturbing and enlightening, it forces the 
subject to abandon any binary understanding of the categories composing sexuality or 
recognition. Because disability is typically shackled to the idea of a fixed body, and the 
subjects living with disability are considered inseparably bound to their physical 
difference, the line between dis/ability is not often granted the same leeway. The able-
bodied might not be uncomfortable watching a disabled person enact a series of 
motions—or say, describe that same series in writing—because they believe they 
understand the limitations dictating such an experience, and do not expect to be surprised. 
For Mairs, this false assumption acts as the perfect gateway for disruption. Because it is 
unexpected, her performance of able-bodiedness—of “normalcy” and of mental 
stability—knocks her reader off-guard, and forces us to amend our expectations.  
Thus Mairs purposefully asserts the choice involved in her suicide attempt, and 
meticulously describes her actions leading up to it: feeding the cat, writing a letter, and 
cleaning her kitchen are all domestic performances that would appear to contradict her 
position on the brink of insanity. On the outside, she gives such a compelling 
performance that “You’re more likely to think you’re seeing Mrs. Middle America than a 
madwoman” (Mairs 149). In regards to her MS, less disguisable than her struggle with 
depression, Mairs still maintains control over her performance. When describing the day-
to-day activities that she completes, the domestic rituals that she associates with 
“normalcy,” she rarely alludes to her physical limitation; in fact, several of her Plaintext 
essays neglect to mention the fact that she has MS at all. Taken out of context, the reader 
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might never know. Like gender, ability is a performative state; the behavioral 
characteristics that define it go far beyond physical capacity, and can be appropriated by 
anyone who has been exposed to them. For someone like Nancy Mairs, this point is 
highlighted even further by the ambiguity of her disease. While sitting down waiting for a 
doctor to approach, she gives such a convincing performance of able-bodiedness that it 
takes him a moment to realize why she is there. It is not until she “push[es] [her]self 
up…and stumble[s] toward him” (20) that he believes he can categorize, and therefore 
understand, her. 
Mairs claims authority with her written word, and by placing herself at an 
advantage, repositions MS as merely one of the many challenges she faces. She identifies 
disability—and the supposed opposite, “normalcy”—as mutual aspects of the 
performance of her identity, and makes conscious shifts between them. Even when the 
physical takes over, as is inevitable with a disease such as MS, Mairs’s writing remains 
as the site of her ultimate control.  But what are the limitations on this medium? Is there a 
way to acknowledge the moment when the disabled body defies intellectual control 
without assuming that it compromises the subject’s power? The answer is yes; and it 
exists in dance. A far cry from its classical, image-obsessed roots, there is a world of 
dance that embraces not only a multitude of bodies, but also multiplicity of storylines, 
identities, and themes: Contact Improvisation. Here, the usually segregated worlds of 
writing and dance are seen for what they really are: terms of communication for voices 
that might not otherwise be heard. 
 
Moving Bodies, Moving Words 
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In this day and age “to dance is a radical act” (LaMothe). Even though the written 
word has traditionally been heralded as the pinnacle mode of expression, and it certainly 
is for Mairs, there are certain truths that may not be translated to paper: the “authority” of 
words “comes from the experiences they express” (LaMothe). When considering the art 
forms most accepting of disabled bodies, dance has typically been left out of the 
question—and for good reason. Classical dance, such as ballet, worships an impossible 
ideal of bodily perfection, often at the expense of the dancers’ wellbeing. However, 
Contact Improvisation (CI) is on the opposite end of the spectrum: with no ideal body to 
sensationalize, it exists only for the freedom of dancers and audiences alike. A far cry 
from ballet, this “casual” dance form “emphasizes the release of the body’s weight,” and 
is far more concerned with “the experience of internal sensations and the flow of the 
movement between two bodies” (Albright 84) than with controlled perfection. 
According to Albright, a dancer-theorist who “enjoys making academics dance 
and dancers write” (216), the boundaries we erect between these two modes of expression 
are not as legitimate as we take them for. The structure—or lack thereof—of Contact 
mirrors the open-endedness of Plaintext, and like Mairs’s writing, “redefines the body” 
by forcing us to see it as “a body in process, a body becoming” (Albright 76). Many of 
Albright’s descriptions of CI praise it for “radically restructuring the traditional frames of 
dance representation” (64), deconstructing the expectation that dance exists in and for a 
proscenium stage-bound narrative. Where most classical dance forms revolve around 
linear storytelling, CI is concerned with the “dancers’ ongoing experience” (86): with no 
clear beginning or end to the movement dialogue created, it accommodates the “ever-
changing flux of bodies” (76) in a way that is true to reality. The improvisation at the 
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heart of Contact forms a strikingly similar parallel to Mairs’s description of her life 
trajectory; because “one never finishes adjusting to MS” (Mairs 19), she never attempts 
to present her experience as anything other than a “work-in-progress, a process of 
becoming rather than an immutable fact of physicality” (Mintz 4, emphasis mine). 
Mairs’s essays present structural disjointedness that mirrors the unpredictability of the 
“pain, altered shape, and loss of function and mobility” (Mintz 26) contained in her 
disease, and furthermore, “force a continual renegotiation of the nature of self and 
selfhood” (26). Just as her textual inventiveness allows this negotiation to be realized, 
Contact demands that its subjects navigate the instability of adapting to each and every 
moment. Any veteran of the dance form could relate to Mairs’s disclosure that she 
“know[s] what it is like to exist from minute to minute” (Mairs 140).  
Though she might not consider herself a dancer, and finds solace in the fact that 
her “predilections were already solitary, sedentary, and bookish” (Mairs 12) prior to her 
diagnosis with MS, Mairs’s prose is full of movement. Despite any physical limitations 
she might have, she describes herself “in a graceful pose, my head thrown back” (152) 
and often gives descriptions of her surroundings that beg to be translated to bodily 
gesture, such as the “slow motion” of a day that melted by as though she were “under 
water” (126). When identifying herself as a “cripple,” she says, “I swagger” (9). This 
verb carries a distinct energy with it, and would be fascinating if transferred to dance. In 
fact, it often is: because Contact “privileges a willingness to take physical and emotional 
risks” (Albright 85) over technical virtuosity, it has long been inclusive of bodies of all 
abilities. Since the 1980s—perhaps as a result of a growing intersection between 
disability and the arts (Albright 86)—Contact has focused on exploring the possibilities 
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presented by physically disabled and ailing bodies, and has used the expanded movement 
vocabulary to “refuse the known, the easy habit, the well-traveled path” (86). Because 
those living with Cerebral Palsy—or in Mairs’s case, MS—can be taxed by even the 
simplest gestures, each expansion upon their movement necessarily springs from the type 
of fearlessness that Contact holds in high esteem. Far from being excluded from dance, in 
the world of Contact Improv, those living with disabilities are seamlessly folded into the 
group; and like every other dancer, regardless of ability, they are praised for meeting their 
challenges head on. 
 
Staying in Touch: Mutual Reliance 
The type of brazenness that Contact Improv encourages is mirrored in Mairs’s use 
of language. Just as improvisational dancing provides a forum for dancers of all abilities 
to exert their creative voice, Mairs finds the authority to express hers in life writing—and 
just as she desires for her audience to squirm at her honesty, Contact enforces the 
“willingness to feel intensely awkward and uncomfortable” (Albright 87). While Mairs’s 
writing destabilizes the binary between dis/ability, the “continuum of abilities” (Albright 
xxv) at the heart of Contact makes it the site of “certain psychic disorientation in which 
the seemingly stable categories of able and disabled become dislodged” (85). However, at 
the place where dance achieves its revolution through principles of touch and weight 
sharing, the parallel to Mairs appears to halt. In both the physical and metaphorical sense, 
Mairs “hate[s] to be touched,” because she considers it to be one and the same with being 
“known” (Plaintext 87)—she resists letting people get close to her because it runs the 
“risk” of others “touching the inner workings of your life, not merely your body” (88). 
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Still, part of Mairs’s position as an unreliable narrator—and part of the space left open 
between individual essays—is that we often realize things that she does not; in this case, 
that the very act of writing her life is allowing us to touch her world. While she is able to 
maintain a critical distance by putting her experiences into words, to be read at a later 
date, she is unabashedly describing her most intimate moments; whereas in Contact, an 
emotional distance may be maintained where a physical one never can. Perhaps this is the 
most significant difference between the two formats of expression: that the source of the 
disability, whether it manifests in a more physical or intellectual manner, dictates the 
shape that its catharsis must take. In any case, the line between writing and dancing is far 
less distinct than traditional generic distinctions have made it out to be: like most of the 
binaries that swarm at the heart of disability studies, it is overly simplistic, and deserves 
to be disrupted. 
Despite her qualms, it is interpersonal touch itself that rescues Mairs: in “On 
Touching By Accident,” she explains how an unexpected visitor to her house—“a figure 
[that] danced out of the darkness…and pleaded, ‘Oh, can I use your bathroom?’” (Mairs 
23)—halts her preparations to commit suicide. The dialogue that begins with this 
capricious interruption engages her in a relationship—much like the moment-to-moment 
interactions of CI—which ultimately saves her life. When referencing the most 
challenging eras of her life, Mairs writes that she “can trace the progress of my therapy 
and my satisfaction with it through my attitude toward [my daughter] Anne and my duties 
to her” (146). It is this sense of dependency, by no means separate from Mairs’s position 
as a feminist, which “offers itself as a new departure for feminist political 
theorizing”(Butler 196): empowerment need not be “trapped within the unnecessary 
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binarism of free will and determinism”(201). Though Mairs’s physical state demands her 
reliance on others, it is her emotional wellbeing that is rescued—and strengthened—when 
she gives, and bears, the weight of others. Mairs posits herself as a fiercely independent, 
authoritative narrator; however, her interactions with others are what truly define her. 
This interdependence—both in and in-between the lines of Plaintext—is what makes 
Mairs an essential voice in women’s life writing, as well as a critical partner to the 
subject of my next chapter: Lucy Grealy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
 
Lucy Grealy: Autobiography of a Face 
 
 
“Mirror, mirror on the wall… who is the fairest one of all?”   
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 If only the evil queen had been satisfied with the answer, Snow White would have 
led a much less eventful life. Though reality rarely gives us the chance to interact with 
enchanted mirrors, the plight of Snow White’s queen implies a familiar scenario: in 
modern-day America, we come face-to-face with our faces at every turn, and often trust 
these reflections to present us with an accurate evaluation of our embodied selves. In 
what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls an “ocularcentric era” (qtd. in Mintz 49), more 
emphasis is currently placed on the visual than ever before—and mirrors, whether in the 
shellacked window of a storefront or the gaze of a stranger, can be both a blessing and a 
curse. 
For the late Lucy Grealy, author of Autobiography of a Face, mirrors take on 
myriad roles. On the one hand, they represent what she is most afraid of—a reflection of 
her face, the site of more than thirty failed attempts at jaw reconstruction—yet they also 
generate possibility, making up the “textual hall of mirrors” inherent in life narrative, “in 
which the narrated object is also a gazing subject” (Mintz 50). Just as a hall of mirrors 
casts images back and forth in an endless dialogue, autobiography presents a similar lack 
of unity: the subject writing is also the object being stared at, presenting the self as a 
multifaceted being that reclaims agency through language. Grealy is used to being the 
focus of attention, but through the medium of writing, she looks outward—rewriting, 
“literally reconfigur[ing]” (Mintz 19) her relationship to her face—creating a moment “in 
which we may recognize our own bodies, our own contingent selves” and therefore 
“reappraise the meaning of what [we] see” (50). Grealy uses her position as the author of 
her own story—the visionary with the potential to re-vision the way she is evaluated—to 
forge a mirroring in which her gaze is the only one that counts. Furthermore, because her 
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face in the mirror does not match up with her internal sense of self, Grealy reveals the 
unreliability of vision as a portal into reality; she complicates the idea that external 
appearance reflects the spirit or self. By the end of her narrative, Grealy assures the 
reader that she has abandoned all mirrors as a reliable source of evaluation—that is, all 
except for one. 
Lucy Grealy’s relationship with Ann Patchett, an acclaimed novelist, goes beyond 
the typical limitations of identity: throughout Patchett’s description of their bond, which 
she details in Truth and Beauty: A Friendship, their voices intertwine to the point where 
one woman’s story is virtually inseparable from the other. Though Grealy often demands 
that Patchett act as a mirror, repeatedly asking her to confirm her appearance and 
accomplishments, the relationship between the two is more akin a pane of clear glass: 
though space exists between their two stories, it is translucent. Their experiences overlap 
in crucial ways; and in Beauty, published years after Grealy’s death, Patchett fills in gaps 
left open in Face and honors their mutually dependent relationship. This textual 
relationality not only suggests that identity is mutable, a theme that reoccurs throughout 
Mairs’s and Grealy’s text, it also challenges the notion of in/dependence altogether; even 
though “independence” is linguistically modified to be the opposite of dependence, the 
two states are far from mutually exclusive. Though disability and illness often expedite 
the process, this chapter will build upon the idea that we are all dependent on human 
connection; and that by virtue of their interconnected lives—and texts—Grealy and 
Patchett suggest a new way of looking at autonomy in female life narrative.  
 
Lucy Grealy: Language and the Mindbody 
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 At the age of nine, Lucy Grealy’s life was changed by a kickball game: a 
classmate slammed into her jaw, setting a chain of events into motion that would 
eventually reveal a diagnosis for Ewing’s Sarcoma, a rare form of cancer. In the fifteen 
years following, Grealy underwent more than thirty reconstructive surgeries—at times, 
losing more than one-third of her jaw—and a host of related health problems, all of which 
she discusses with candor in Face. She uses the space of her text as a forum for reversing 
social dynamics, speaking with authority on matters that she is uniquely qualified to 
address; for example, her mixed experience with Western medicine. Though she has a 
complex relationship to doctors, crediting them as her protectors and companions, she 
never shies away from describing their often brutal—and misinformed—treatment: not 
only is she repeatedly misdiagnosed, Grealy states that her doctors are “predictably 
patronizing” (Grealy 146), that one “hit…just slightly too hard with his reflex hammer” 
(74), and that—even when she was in agony, and “begged them to stop” (169)—“no one 
seemed to care very much” (198). By staking her text as a space where she has authority, 
she complicates the hierarchy that favors doctors and other medical professionals. 
Furthermore, Grealy also undermines the power dynamic that favors an able-bodied gaze; 
by refusing to hold back the nasty truth, her authority reverberates off the walls of a 
forum—writing, and art in general—that has historically been orchestrated around the 
aesthetically pleasing. At times, Grealy’s story is far from pleasing; and when non-
disfigured readers are made uncomfortable, their power is compromised. 
 Like Grealy’s life, Autobiography of a Face is a text full of paradox. In addition 
to her inconsistent view of doctors, she often changes her mind about solitude; while she 
states that she relishes time spent unaccompanied, Patchett reveals about Grealy that “the 
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simple act of being alone was nearly impossible” (Patchett 114) for her. Secondly, though 
Grealy ends Face with a vow to avoid gazing in every reflective surface that surrounds 
her, the title of her text itself speaks to the fact that her face is at the center of her concept 
of self. She blames it for every problem that arises in her post-cancer life—telling us that 
she “was my face, I was ugliness” (Grealy 7)—yet at the same time, declares that she is 
never able to fully identify with it. Her paradoxical relationship to her face both 
highlights the mutability of the self in relation to the physical body, which is always 
changing, and emphasizes the vulnerability of Grealy’s voice—she does not have all the 
answers, nor does she claim to. This messiness, far from undermining her story, lends it 
an openness that might not be found in a logical, unswerving narrative. Regardless of her 
oft-changing stance on her face, the reader is able to interpret its all-consuming effect on 
her self-esteem, and is left to ask questions about American culture: what are the social 
expectations that recognize the face as the part most directly connected with standards of 
beauty, and why do they exist? Grealy does not claim to solve this dilemma; however, 
when she does direct the reader’s attention toward her face—the “deviant” part of her 
appearance—she “rewrite[s]” her face “as a foundational aspect of her identity rather 
than a grotesque error to be overcome” (Mintz 19). This results in “a confrontation with 
cultural mythology,” revealing “the deleterious effects not of disease but, rather, of 
normative attitudes about beauty and identity” 53).  
Only four years old when her family immigrated from Ireland, Grealy was born 
into a way of thinking that romanticized the United States as “something big, a whole 
way of life, an idea, a piece of magic” (Grealy 33); however, her experience during 
adolescence compromises this vision. Like the suburban neighborhoods where “house 
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after house looked exactly like the one next to it, save for the occasional cement deer or 
sculpted shrub” (2), negative reactions to her face lead her to internalize the idea that 
“beauty, as defined by society at large, seemed to be only about who was best at looking 
like everyone else” (187). Contemplating the moments that contributed to this realization, 
Grealy tells her reader: “Society is no help. It tells us again and again that we can most be 
ourselves by acting and looking like someone else, only to leave our original faces behind 
to turn into ghosts that will inevitably resent and haunt us” (222). Though this notion 
plagues Grealy for most of her life, and she comes to associate physical beauty with the 
sole purpose of attracting men (187), she only questions the forces that put this idea in 
place in a roundabout way. While American culture places an inordinate amount of 
attention on all physical beauty—telling the general public that it is only a pluck of the 
eyebrow, a box of teeth-whitener, and a four hundred dollar pair of jeans away from 
looking and feeling stellar—most attention is placed on facial beauty, especially for 
women. Grealy is more than aware of this fact, convinced that “the anguish of an 
anomalous face surpasses all other forms of injury or difference” (Mintz 57) when it 
comes to attractiveness. Even when her hospital roommate loses both of her breasts, and 
feels she has lost her femininity, Grealy has “no patience with her lament”; the woman 
still has a husband, something Grealy is convinced that she herself will never have. This 
solidifies her “conviction of the importance in this world of having a beautiful face” 
(Grealy 168).  
Because she is in her lived experience, Grealy has difficulty separating it from the 
social conventions affecting her woes. Looking in, we have the opportunity to see what 
Grealy sometimes cannot: that her interaction with the world is not only subject to, but 
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shaped by social attitudes toward beauty and difference. Seeing these conventions at 
work, we are able to question their naturalization: despite the fact that the media spews 
single-note presentations of facial beauty, there is nothing innate that demands we react 
to difference in a negative way. Face leaves us with a heightened awareness of this fact, 
and reminds us that—whether the case is as extreme as Grealy’s or not—difference is an 
inherent part of life, and it is our responsibility to respect it. 
 The many negative responses to Grealy’s face reinforce this point by providing a 
contrast. Throughout the text, the gaze of strangers—usually rooted in ignorance—
manifests in cruelty: young children are unafraid to call her a monster, and at one point, a 
group of older men drunkenly shout that she looks like a dog. According to Cohen’s 
Monster Theory, these reactions are evident of a sameness found within the Other’s 
physical abnormality; something in the aberrance reminds onlookers of themselves, and 
spurs them to lash out. This certainly affects Grealy: even when she is cancer free, she 
feels that her misshapen jaw “cancels out” (Grealy 157) the rest of her face and body, 
even the parts that she deems resolutely “sexy” (207). This causes her to seek surgery 
even when it is not medically warranted—a detail that “enriches feminist inquiry” by 
blurring the line between reconstructive and cosmetic procedures, revealing “both [as] 
efforts to normalize bodies by eradicating difference”(Mintz 6).  
In the same way that it is a forum for reclaiming authority over her body, Grealy’s 
text, like Mairs’s, is a testament to its author’s ability to handle even the worst situations 
with humor. Though she often feels hopeless, Grealy sees “some comic aspects to [her] 
predicament” (199), and—also similar to Mairs—deliberately uses unexpected language 
to allow room for a reconsideration of the situation at hand. For example, when a friend 
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at school asks whether she is dying, Grealy responds “in the tone of voice I’d have used if 
she’d asked me whether I was the pope” (121). This humor demonstrates her ability to 
reframe the direness of what is happening to her: she even relays that she was 
“fascinated” by the pain she experienced, and describes “how strangely peaceful [she] 
felt” (16) while it was occurring. She also reveals her awareness that “normally I’d have 
no reason to ‘feel’ my body or know it so intimately” (91). By steering clear of the 
maudlin vocabulary often used to describe illness and death, Grealy encourages a 
reconsideration of spoken language as the ultimate communicator of truth. 
 Grealy plays with the ambiguity of language, questioning its power: “Language 
supplies us with ways to express ever subtler levels of meaning,” she states, “but does 
that imply language gives meaning, or robs us of it when we are at a loss to name 
things?” (44). She points out the double meaning contained in specific words, such as 
stroke—which may signify a caress or a paralyzing episode, depending on context. Years 
after her initial diagnosis, when she finally hears the word “cancer” uttered in conjunction 
with her experience, everything changes; up until that point, the reality of her situation 
had been “couched in jargon” (46) that masked its severity. This raises a crucial point, 
especially regarding disability and illness as a category of identity: how much stigma, 
how much stress, is caused by the simple fact that we grope for words to describe our 
worlds, to recognize our fears and desires and make them tangible, when certain 
experiences lie beyond the realm of spoken language? 
 Grealy is aware of the cultural importance of words, and the fact that they are 
often granted permission to label the world. However, she uses this potential limitation as 
a solution: “because the violence of cultural bias is deployed through language, it can be 
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rewritten” (Mintz 66). Words, whether in the context of a diagnosis or a cruel comment 
made by a classmate, contributed greatly to Grealy’s internalization of inadequacy—
without them, she may not have believed so firmly in her deviance. It is language that 
leads to what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls the “formal rather than functional” (57) 
aspect of her disability—meaning that it was “a disability constructed totally by stigma 
and cultural meanings” (54). Though this is a controversial distinction that I will return to 
later, it draws attention to an interesting fact: because language was the hand by which 
she suffered, it is the very tool that Grealy uses to fight back. Rather than leave her story 
up to the hordes of doctors speaking about her in the third person, or to anyone who 
represents an experience of disability or illness without first walking and seeing from that 
perspective—regardless of whether that walking or seeing is done in a conventional 
manner—she tells it herself, exactly as she wants it. This complicates the one-sided 
“stare” dynamic in which passersby gawk at Otherness in a moment of “simultaneous 
desire and repulsion,” having seen something of themselves within the “monster” (Cohen 
16): by the very act of writing her own text, Grealy sends the gaze back outward—rather 
than look away, as she is expected to do, she stares back. By writing the truth of their 
experiences as only they know it, in texts as equally hybrid as their own “monstrous” 
selves, Grealy and Mairs go against the cultural expectation that they “mask” behaviors 
that would “disturb the public” (Linton 152): and in doing so, challenge the idea that they 
are monstrous in the first place.      
“Only the life narrator knows the experience of traffic rushing toward her and 
makes an interpretation of that situation” (Smith & Watson 5): and accordingly, Grealy 
tells her story on her own terms, using the vocabulary she has developed “to name [her] 
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own private losses” (Grealy 52). This is the ultimate act of empowerment; as Patchett 
puts it, Grealy “claimed complete ownership of her history. It was her world and she 
would present it the way she wanted to” (Patchett qtd. in Grealy 231). Grealy does more 
than just remember the events of her life and relay them in yet another heartbreaking 
testament about the trials and tribulations of illness; “‘I wrote it,’” she insisted. “I’m a 
writer” (Grealy 231). There is a chasm between the simple act of relaying information 
and creating art, and by rooting herself in the latter category, Grealy expands the place of 
disability and illness memoirs in the grand scheme of life writing—taking them out of the 
realm of “victim art” and securing their rightful place amongst other memoirs. According 
to Patchett, Grealy’s form of life writing represents “flecks of gold panned out of [the] 
great, muddy river” (232) that is life. “This is why the writer matters,” Patchett tells us. 
“[Grealy] was making art, not documenting an event” (231). 
While it is easy to agree with the assertion that Grealy’s disability was primarily 
superficial, especially considering the social norms that told her she was defective, the 
reality is not so simple; between the radical operations (at one point, removing an entire 
bone from her leg) and chemotherapy, Grealy spent a considerable amount of time in 
extreme pain that left her unable to function. The physical discomfort, however, was 
“rather easy compared to the sort of emotional assault of guilt and shame that [she] was 
continuously throwing upon [her]self” (Patchett 136). This suggests that the line between 
“formal” and “functional” disability, as Garland-Thompson labels them, is not as solid as 
might be desired for the purpose of easy categorization. Grealy’s example demonstrates 
the fact that the functional often comes as a result of the formal, and vice versa. They are 
inseparable. Even when Grealy’s cancer is in remission, she suffers from extreme 
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dis/ease—the effects of which are often more immobilizing than all the hours she spent in 
a hospital. As a child, Grealy is aware of the dichotomy between bodily pain and 
emotional ordeal; in fact, the “physical drama seemed a bit of light relief” (Grealy 26) 
because “if nothing else, [it] was honest and open—you knew exactly what you were 
dealing with” (90). Compared to her feelings of inadequacy and shame for “failing not to 
suffer,” Grealy states, “the physical pain seemed almost easy” (90).  
As though in a vacuum created by the lack of corrective treatments, the latter half 
of Grealy’s life was spent battling severe depression: but just as her jaw caused her 
mental anguish, her depression manifested itself in corporeal means as well. Patchett’s 
text provides for an increased understanding of this connection in her description of 
Grealy’s “scorching bouts of depression,” which she says “would regularly roll her into a 
little ball and paralyze her” (Patchett 42, emphasis mine). Even though Grealy’s time 
spent physically paralyzed in a hospital bed was limited, her depression often became so 
overwhelming that she “couldn’t move” (77). Her vocabulary is often rooted in the 
physical as well: at times, she is “churning and shrinking” (Grealy 185) within her skin, 
and feels “fear’s physical rush swelled inside [her]” (143). Compared to the physical 
procedures—after which she was usually up and about, bounding and dancing long 
before recommended by hospital staff—the “stupor of grief” (Grealy 163) that 
accompanies her loneliness is the most debilitating aspect of her illness, despite the fact 
that depression is not socially recognized as a disability.  
What her text does, then—and what her fearlessness in describing her depression 
achieves—is a reversal of the typical mind/body dichotomy established in literature and 
in social contexts. When physical illness and depression accompany one another, as they 
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do for Grealy and Mairs, they shine a light on the fluid boundary between issues of the 
mind and body: one is often the impetus of the other, and they continue back and forth in 
dialogue. In Face, Grealy reverses typical assumptions about her disability by stating the 
“overwhelming attacks of shame” (185) are, in fact, what prevent her from leading a 
normal life. A more accurate recognition of disability in the social sphere must 
acknowledge this emotional and physical entwinement, or it will fail to be 
comprehensive. “It’s one thing to ignore your arm or your stomach,” she reveals, “but 
ignoring your head isn’t quite so simple” (Grealy 91). Grealy adds to the voices calling 
for a more complete acknowledgment of disability—and life, for that matter—that seeks 
not to separate the stomach from the head in the first place, but instead, asks how the two 
inform one another. 
 Even admirers of Grealy’s work fall into the trap of separating her mind from her 
body, representing a recurring issue in reviews of artwork that deals with disability and/or 
illness. Rather than judge Face for its artistic merit, the Detroit Free Press applauds 
Grealy for creating a “powerful testament to the triumph of the human spirit.” Even given 
her statement that “the body is a connected thing” (56), Mademoiselle also praised Grealy 
for the way she “compensates—and ultimately overcomes—with wit, intelligence, and 
unconquerable spirit.” This begs the question: what is she overcoming? Even though 
Grealy survived dozens of trips beneath the surgical knife, to suggest that she bypassed 
the toil on her body—particularly concerning its effect on her mental wellbeing—denies 
the very heart of her story, which “suggests that thinking in terms of ‘twoness’ at all—of 
‘body’ and ‘mind’ as discrete, if connected, entities—falsely separates what are 
interpenetrating and constitutive aspects of self” (Mintz 52). Patchett follows up on this 
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point, reiterating once and for all that “the last thing [Grealy] saw herself as, the last thing 
she wanted to be, was the poster girl for the human spirit” (Patchett 230). One of the 
main revelations that Patchett grants in Truth and Beauty is the fact that Grealy’s mental 
strength, her “spirit,” was often broken as a result of outside influences. Generally, in life 
writing surrounding disability and illness, the “body read as broken becomes a measure 
of both social value and strength of character or spiritual worth” (Mintz 59). But when 
such qualities are emphasized at the expense of embracing the corporeality inherent in 
every story, a dangerous dichotomy occurs. By questioning this binary between mind and 
body, Patchett and Grealy’s works—particularly when viewed in light of one another—
open up a more truthful way of looking at autobiography: as a story composed of more 
than one perspective, more than one self, and unquestionably rooted in the body. 
 
Relationality 
 The concept of relational autobiography, a term coined by Susan Stanford 
Friedman in 1985, is of particular relevance to my analysis of Grealy and Patchett. In 
Reading Autobiography, relational autobiography is one of fifty-two categories—not 
including sub-categories and themes—that Sidone Smith and Julia Watson credit with 
comprising the various forms of life narrative. According to the two authors, the early 
modern period in the West, the historical crux of autobiography, was a moment intent on 
“celebrat[ing] the autonomous individual and the universalizing life story” (Smith & 
Watson 3); stories written by the individual for his or her own “self-interested” 
evaluation of the “status of the soul” (2) achieved great popularity. In the years since, 
postmodern theorists have begun to discuss the inadequacy of “autobiography” not only 
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to capture the reality of lives, but also the complexity of the “individual” that seeks to 
describe them. No longer preoccupied with a fiction of the self as a cohesive, static entity, 
concepts of autobiography have expanded to encompass a host of new possibilities, one 
of which is the idea of relationality. The first relation in question exists between reader 
and writer: because life is a process, not a “true-or-false story,” communication occurs 
within the text that bridges both parties in an “intersubjective exchange…aimed at 
producing a shared understanding of the meaning of a life” (Smith & Watson 13). This is 
especially true of Grealy, who—far from writing her text merely for others to find 
connections to their own pain and misfortune—addresses issues that drive readerly 
reconsideration of social norms, and pushes awareness of the cultural moment in which 
the story takes place.  
It is the second type of relationality, however, that truly makes a difference in 
understanding Grealy’s impact on autobiographical narrative. Over the course of a 
lifetime, we all encounter “significant others…those whose stories are deeply implicated” 
in our own, and through whose stories we understand our formation and transformation 
(Smith & Watson 65). To call an autobiography the story of a singular, untouched life 
would be overly simplistic and ignorant of the fact that “no ‘I’ speaks except as and 
through its others” (Smith & Watson 67). While it is crucial that Grealy tell her own 
story, reclaiming agency out of a “cultural script” (42) that constantly demeans her, 
Patchett offers a supplementary perspective in Beauty. At times, Patchett writes between 
the lines of Grealy’s story—augmenting her friend’s testament until she “blurs the line 
between auto- and biography”—and at others, she offers a new set of eyes that is able to 
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detach, comment, and dig into the “dynamic recognition” that makes 
“identity…necessarily relational” (Smith & Watson 66, 202).   
 Relationality in autobiography is a critical departure away from the idea of the 
autonomous individual, because it describes women’s life narratives as “interdependent 
and identified with a community…[capturing] a sense of shared identity” that “exists in 
tension with a sense of their own uniqueness…[across] fluid boundaries between self and 
an Other or others” (Smith & Watson 201). Grealy, already an Other by societal 
standards, relies on Patchett both physically and emotionally; she asks her friend to cradle 
her self-esteem when she is crumpled on the floor, and leaps into her arms each time they 
see each other, indicating that Patchett “was to hold her for as long as she wanted to stay” 
(Patchett 6). Extending the Aesop’s fable regarding the relationship between a 
grasshopper and ant, Patchett infuses Truth and Beauty with a golden metaphor of what it 
is like to be in a mutually dependent—yet balanced—friendship. For Patchett, Grealy is 
another from whom she can expand her own identity; like the ant in the Aesop’s fable, 
she relies on the grasshopper to bring the “truth and beauty to the party” (20). And yet, 
unlike most people, she never makes Grealy into an Other—in fact, whenever she sees 
her friend, she says it is akin to returning to her native country (216). Patchett almost 
exclusively describes their combined effort, both as friends and as writers who “volley 
ideas back and forth until neither of us was sure who belonged to what” (22), using the 
pronoun “we”; for all intensive purposes, they are inseparable. She writes: 
Our friendship was like our writing in some ways. It was the only thing that was 
interesting about our otherwise very dull lives. We were better off when we were 
together. Together we were a small society of ambition and high ideals. We were 
tender and patient and kind. We were not like the world at all (73). 
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For the two women, writing is daily bread, their precious way of interacting with the 
world—so to extend it to one another in a selfless exchange demonstrates their 
interconnectedness. Not only does Grealy act as a voice inside Patchett’s head, dictating 
what she should and should not do, her medical traumas affect her friend in severe, often 
physical means; Patchett loses sleep, weight, and even neglects a case of hives in order to 
be by her friend’s bedside. “Lucy and I were one another’s history” (155), she says. 
When Truth and Beauty was published in 2004, two years after Grealy’s death, author 
Joyce Carol Oates praised the novel not as a solo, but as “an inspired duet.”  
 
Performing the Autobodyography 
We are always fragmented in time, taking a particular or provisional perspective 
on the moving target of our pasts, addressing multiple and disparate audiences. 
Perhaps, then, it is more helpful to approach autobiographical telling as a 
performative act. (Smith & Watson 47) 
 
Relationality, or the idea that individual stories are always woven into others, 
does more than just provide for a more comprehensive picture of life: it implies that the 
“I” within that story is variable and elastic (Smith & Watson 65). Over the course of one 
day, every person cycles through a progression of identities—those related to gender, 
career, nationality, and education, to name a few—categories that, by the very nature of 
their diversity, hold the potential to conflict with one another (33). “Because of this 
constant placement and displacement of ‘who we are,’” Smith and Watson argue, “we 
can think of identities as multiple and as ‘contextual, contested, and contingent” (33). 
One of the most significant shifts in viewing identity has been the realization of the 
discursive self; no “I” exists except in and through the interactions, language, and history 
surrounding its construction, defying the fiction of any unified self (Smith & Watson 47). 
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They continue, “The stuff of autobiographical storytelling, then, is drawn from multiple, 
disparate, and discontinuous experiences and the multiple identities constructed from and 
constituting those experiences” (35). In Grealy’s case, these are represented through her 
entwinement with Patchett and the daily negotiation of her own multifarious identities.  
Though life writing surrounding disability and illness is not the only category that 
draws attention to the fiction of a coherent self, it magnifies it. Societal norms have 
traditionally sought to jam the spectrum of ability into an overly simplistic, universal 
definition for the purpose of categorization. Grealy, however, calls for a different kind of 
universality; she wants people to understand things about themselves by reading her 
story, but not at the expense of understanding the specificity bound up in her multipart 
identity. Her relationality with Patchett is not the only area where her identity is 
splintered beyond the “monolithic categories that have culturally identified [her]” (Smith 
& Watson 109): she also inhabits a variety of roles throughout her life, and performs 
them with gusto—drawing attention to the way we perceive identities, and how they are 
most accurately depicted in autobiography. 
 In the course of one lifetime—and occasionally, in the course of one day—Grealy 
adopts characteristics of a charming invalid, humble martyr, glamorous hospital patient, 
tomboy, outsider, tortured poet, and hyper-sexualized bombshell. Sometimes her role-
playing is an effort to appease her internal image of how she should behave; however, her 
costumed changeability often occurs at the prompting of others. For example, each time 
she plays the “role of sick child” with meek acceptance, which she muses would make 
her “an equally good fascist or religious martyr” (Grealy 30), it is out of an effort to 
protect her mother and impress her doctors. While it is understood that “both the unified 
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story and the coherent self” are “myths” surrounding every identity (Smith & Watson 
47), this lack of unity is especially relevant for Grealy: after all, her face—the center of 
her text and her attention—is constantly in flux. Its appearance changes so drastically 
throughout her lifetime that it is impossible for her to identify with an image of what it 
looks like—so much so that she identifies her mirrored reflection as an “imposter” 
(Grealy 220). The fact remains, however, that Grealy writes her autobiography of her 
face—in her opinion, she “was [her] face” (7)—therefore, it must be the change itself that 
she identifies with. This point is crucial: not only do the various roles that Grealy adopts 
deny “our hold on any single, essential ‘Lucy,’” but her face’s steady state of change—
ironically, the only constant—allows her story itself to be “unexpectedly mobile, 
available to new meanings, revisable” (Mintz 66).  
 Though each and every self is diverse, the unpredictability inherent in living with 
illness and/or disability amplifies the moment-to-moment nature of navigating this 
multiplicity. In Grealy’s case, she not only lives her identities, she also performs them. 
Even before the accident that revealed her cancer, Grealy’s persona was dominated by a 
desire to be noticed—so much so that the initial attention she gains from her medical 
treatments makes her feel like the “principal player” (Grealy 20) in a “great adventure, 
the star of my own television special” (26). Throughout her narrative, she regularly 
adopts the position of an outsider looking in at the drama of her situation; “even as I was 
aware of my own overblown melodrama,” she writes, “I took a strange comfort in this 
romantic, tragic role” (182). This observational quality grants an air of performance to 
her role-playing, making her at once the person who enacts the identities and the one who 
“witnessed [her] life unfolding like someone who has awkwardly stumbled in after the 
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movie has started” (Grealy 129). Furthermore, she is dependent on an audience to grant 
meaning, stating that “their approval or disapproval defined everything” (4). During the 
long afternoons spent alone in her house, Grealy questions whether the events unfolding 
around her would carry the same meaning in her absence. Because she is the subject of 
visual scrutiny, the “visually theatrical aspect of self-writing” provides her with a forum 
to revise the audience-performer interchange exactly as she sees fit, “enabling the 
(potentially endless) performance of new identities” (Mintz 50). This is not to say that her 
performance is unproblematic—it is not. At times, the performance of her face as the 
center of her self—as the title indicates—and periodic distancing from it becomes 
dizzying, and potentially compromises her reader’s trust. However, the very fact that 
Grealy is consciously performing, enabling “the fluid possibilities of identity” (Mintz 
65), restores agency to situations where she might otherwise be helpless; she may be an 
unreliable narrator, but she is a powerful one. 
As Patchett demonstrates, Grealy is dependent on a real-life audience to confirm 
her self-worth; additionally, she “invite[s]” the gaze of her readers “only to invalidate the 
power of the ableist stare” (Mintz 49). By staring back, consciously performing her 
multiple identities, she invites others to “reconsider normative presumptions” (49) 
surrounding what they experience. Reminiscent of Butler’s theory of performativity, 
Smith and Watson explain, “the interiority or self that is said to be prior to the 
autobiographical expression or reflection is an effect of autobiographical storytelling” 
(Smith 143). Essentially, no I—nor multiple I’s, nor the eyes that study them—exist prior 
to the performance in which they are  “produced and reiterated”; always in process, 
always “unstable” (143). 
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This instability is at the heart of the performance metaphor, both in the literal 
interpretation of the word—as it applies to performing arts—and in the sense that it 
contributes toward the ever-shifting, indescribable nature of memoir. In actual theatrical 
production, the process is what is valued; any shakiness or uncertainty is understood to be 
part of the experience. Similarly, the act of “writing oneself onto the stage of one’s own 
narrated life” (Mintz 50) is an erratic one: as Grealy demonstrates, identities are always 
“fragmented in time” (Smith & Watson 47), overlapping with others, and morphing in 
and out of sight. Such changeability is not suited for a typical proscenium stage; life’s 
inherent volatility can only be depicted in a forum that is equally changeable, itself 
subject to contradiction and fissure. Such is the power of life narrative, a “fashionably 
postmodern” collection of genres that flex in order to bear the weight of disparate voices, 
shapes, and stories (Smith & Watson 109).  
Debate is constantly swirling around autobiographical truth in memoir; as Grealy 
demonstrates, there is a fine line between remembering and creating. To address this 
tension within an already mutable category, Grealy—like Mairs—refuses to follow the 
typical ebb and flow of plot. Even though her text is largely chronological, it leaves the 
reader dangling at the end. A far cry from the narrators who return home at the end of the 
tale—sadder but wiser, with something remarkable to show for their efforts—Face is “a 
circular book, a story whose ending always folds back around to the first page” (Patchett 
qtd. in Grealy 236).6 This does not mean that Grealy brings her readers full circle, 
looping back to the self she introduces on page one; rather, her text is a stage on which 
                                                        
6 Interestingly, Grealy and Patchett’s texts themselves overlap to the point where one 
citation is virtually inseparable from the other: Patchett intersperses Beauty with personal 
letter correspondence between herself and Grealy, and also writes the afterword in Face. 
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she runs in circles, caught in an endless cycle of self-reflection that—despite her hope for 
change—does not promise to end anytime soon. The importance of this cyclicality is that 
it is true to life; regardless of disease or disability, the fact remains that reality is 
unpredictable and often disappointing. Like her life, Grealy’s text is dotted with the 
revisiting and reimagining of past events; “reassembl[ing] various pieces of memory, 
experience, identity, embodiment, and agency into new, often hybrid, modes of 
subjectivity” that “interrogate cultural discourses defining and distinguishing the 
normative and abnormative body” (Smith & Watson 109, 42). 
 Of all the common denominators that can be found between identities and their 
narratives, the fact is that they are all process-bound: like Cohen’s monsters, they are 
hybrids—constantly in motion, and two steps ahead of the forces that attempt to define 
them. This “propensity to shift” (Cohen 6) draws attention to another crucial aspect of 
autobiographical writing: embodiment. The body itself is made up of countless processes, 
none of which ever cease to be in motion; a fact highlighted, sometimes grimly, in a body 
ravaged by illness. Writers with disabilities often have to toe a critical paradox between 
being “somehow nobody and nothing but body, all at once” (Mintz 70): because the body 
is the site of conflict, and often the impetus for writing, the artistic merit of the piece can 
be bypassed for its concentration on the physical. This issue has surfaced in some 
feminist discourses as well which discourage female authors from writing about 
reproductive or bodily processes on the grounds that it binds them to their corporeal 
selves.7 
                                                        
7
 A primary theme in ENGL 174; “Contemporary Women Writers,” Professor Gayle 
Greene, Scripps College, Fall 2011. 
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What is interesting, though, is the impossibility of this discouragement: because 
all writers are embodied by the cultural discourses surrounding them, and the act of 
writing itself is a physical act, it stands to reason that “memory itself is embodied” (37). 
As Smith and Watson say, “memories are created as the subject reconstructs a sense of 
identity while engaging with the world in symbolic exchange. Subjectivity is impossible 
unless the subject recognizes her location in the materiality of an ever-present body” (38). 
There can be no “return to the body” in female life narrative or otherwise, because that 
would imply that one has left it—and in reality, there is always a body that perceives the 
sensory world and informs the writer as he or she translates experience into narrative, 
even if the final product is as disjointed as the experience itself. In fact, this very quality 
within Grealy’s autobiographical “manifesto” is what makes it fascinating: seeking “not 
to guarantee a unified female body but, rather, to keep the ‘story’ of the female body in 
motion,” it shows “how the ‘truth’ of particular bodies is open to revision” (Mintz 68). 
The intellectual aspect of autobiography cannot be considered at the expense of the 
corporeal when, in fact, the two are inseparable. Whether the narrative deals with the 
immediate deterioration of the physical body is irrelevant; the text, because it was 
produced by a body, is also necessarily an autobiography of that body—an 
autobodyography. The impact of life writing by women with disabilities is that—because 
their bodily fluctuations are often magnified—their ability to articulate this universal 
experience is heightened as well. 
By admitting that the face she sees does not correspond to the self that she knows, 
Grealy highlights the disconnect between mirrors and truth; just as her face undergoes 
countless transformations, her identity is fragmented into a variety of masks to be 
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adorned. No matter how pristine the glass, no one reflective surface can capture the 
multifarious, transitory nature of the self; however, the forum of life narrative—a stage 
that Grealy uses to “slip in and out of her various personae with great ease, even flair” 
(Grealy 38)—captures the movement inherent in life. The theatricality contained in the 
performance of morphing identities, at once able to be contained within a text and 
completely uncontrollable, is like a hall of mirrors that blurs the line between the “I” 
staring, watching itself being stared at, and staring back out. 
Though it is contained between two covers, Grealy herself admits that at times, 
her writing feels like “a performance piece, something in which the act of doing both 
equaled and surpassed the notion of a single moment in which a piece is ‘completed’” 
(Grealy qtd. in Patchett 205). Though the type of performance that Grealy hints at is a 
metaphorical one, she opens up an interesting question: what new ways of representation, 
perhaps lost in autobiography’s hall of mirrors, can be found in physical performance? 
According to Smith and Watson, visual artists “can place the material body in the picture 
in order to make embodiment visible” (75). Just as language can be used to fight back in 
a sphere where words are used as the means for oppression, it should be possible to use 
this ocularcentric society’s weapon against itself: and what better way to combat the 
intensely visual than through a medium which itself is intrinsically visible? 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Dis/ability and Dance 
 
The dream of first principles is alive when boundaries are transgressed, and life emerges 
as movement in itself. 
- Petra Kuppers, Bodies in Motion 
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In a contest between spoken language and the larynx, only one is considered to be 
the carrier of our innermost thoughts and outermost energies; however, how could words 
exist without a body to articulate them? “Words cannot grant themselves authority,” says 
Kimerer LaMothe, author of “What a Body Knows.” “There are forms of knowing that 
cannot be mediated to us in words, which give words their meaning.” These forms are the 
physical, the corporeal, and the intuitive: and for the body that has been disabled by a 
word that cannot hope to encompass what it claims to describe, physical communication 
speaks volumes where words cannot. In the case of a body that has been marginalized, 
the act of reclaiming authority is “particularly effective in a physical context, since we 
react viscerally to dance and are less able to screen out elements that do not fit into 
intellectual categories” (Desmond 103).  
There’s that word again—dance. As an activity, dancing has long been associated 
with the most able of able-bodies; ballet in particular has been crafted as a forum for 
tremendous physical control. To enter into this sphere, then, as a body that has been 
marked as disabled, is a radical undertaking: it challenges ideas of what dance can be, 
what bodies are capable of, and what social forces have traditionally put dance and 
disability in separate corners. It is “precisely because the body has been a major site of 
oppression that it must be the site of the battle to be waged” (Albright 108): to let the 
body talk, to speak in an organic and sometimes unsettling language that shifts and 
moves—as all living bodies do—denies the fixity disability, exposing the fluid nature of 
societal labels and of identity itself. What Mairs and Grealy capture through the ebb and 
flow of their prose is physically captured in the form of Contact Improvisation—a 
revolutionary dance form that not only welcomes difference, but also thrives on it. 
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Despite the power of words, CI goes where literature cannot: it appeals to an image-
obsessed culture by being visible, but by questioning the validity of what can be seen, 
also undermines the authority of vision. It presents a form that engages the body, mind, 
and soul simultaneously—making it known that “the visible is only one aspect of the 
unfolding dimensions of moving” (Kuppers 134).  
 
Historical Background: The Construction of the Ideal Body 
 Compared with literature, film, philosophy, and painting, dance—as anything less 
than an abstract concept—is typically excluded from critical discussions in the 
Humanities: but according to Norman Bryson, this is more evident of “the quirkiness of 
academic institutions” (Bryson 75) than a lack of relevance. In fact, Bryson says, dance 
presents one of the “most interesting vistas for the humanities at the present time” (76): 
because the body has traditionally been the site upon which social rules are inscribed as 
well as the medium of their portrayal, to observe the body—particularly, what the ‘ideal’ 
body is at any given time—is like looking through a keyhole into the social mentality of 
that historical moment. For example, the inception of ballet coincided with Louis XIV’s 
reign over the court of Versailles. By making ballet a desirable act, high on the social 
ladder—and also codifying the art form with a movement vocabulary that favors 
physically coordinated bodies —Louis XIV ensured that a fit body “formed the basis of 
courtly self-presentation” (Bryson 62). The ‘ideal’ ballet body that we know, love, and 
love to hate was constructed not out of recognition of the reality of bodies, but a desire to 
control a population: “bodily orchestration, discipline, and spectacle” did more than 
found a burgeoning art form, they were at “the heart of the state apparatus” (Bryson 61). 
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A body that did not fit into the prized aesthetic represented a threat—it was a body out of 
state control.  
 Even without Europe’s formal courtly setting, the “frontier mentality” at the root 
of American culture is based on “a simplistic equation of selfhood with freedom in 
physical mobility” (Albright 61). Alongside pipe dreams of self-sufficiency, American 
culture is steeped in capitalistic desires for productivity; and both prize a body that is able 
to move and do more work. To be free, then, one must not simply be mobile, but also 
autonomous: capable of self-control, which—not coincidentally—primes the body for 
being controlled by others. Because of the media’s role in disseminating images of what a 
body ‘should’ look like, it is easy to forget the political interests behind its construction—
but analyzing this impetus “is like an archeological dig into the deep psychic fears 
surrounding disability” (Albright 58). Today, as “American culture is emphasizing with a 
passion heretofore unimagined the need for physical and bodily control” (Albright 73), 
the body that falls outside the perameters of efficient physicality—outside the 
“aspirations of bourgeois individualism” (Albright 63)—represents transgressions not 
only of the boundaries of the body, but also of the institution that created those 
boundaries in the first place. 
 
 
Physically Integrated Dance 
 Though few—and in the case of ballet, hardly any—bodies are able to fit the 
naturalized ideal, the disabled body, as I have argued, has long represented the pinnacle 
of Otherness that threatens to destabilize the state apparatus. For this reason, when the 
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disabled body moves into the role of dancer—a role “historically reserved for the 
glorification of the ideal body” (Albright 57)—it “stakes claim to a radical space, an 
unruly location where disparate assumptions collide” (58). Dance forms like ballet, in 
their “fetishization of control” (Albright 73), represent a fantasy of what the human body 
is capable of under extreme control: the audience settles comfortably into their seats in 
front of the proscenium stage, and the lights dim and rise to signal the beginning and 
ending of the unreality. Not surprisingly, this distinct chasm between performer and 
audience was also a product of Louis XIV’s reign at Versailles, as well as the 
improvements in theatrical sound and lighting technology that arose during the period. In 
this space, the audience typically enters a voyeuristic excursion into the might-be—the 
potential for freakish capability put on display—making it the ideal format for another 
might-be, the possibility of corporeal failure that always looms. According to Janet 
Wolff, all women—not just those that are affected by disability or disease—are 
socialized into believing that their bodies are deficient (87). To put said bodies on 
display, particularly those with outward signs of aging and deterioration, and to present 
them in a positive light is to reclaim some of the agency that has been compromised by 
social demands on an unattainable ideal of controlled perfection.  
In ballet technique, dancers aspire to make the impossibly strenuous appear 
effortless—and combined with the proscenium stage and booming sound, the audience is 
transported through a “fantasy of achievement” (McRobbie 207) and shielded from the 
strain behind the action. Though some mixed-ability (or physically integrated) dance 
companies attempt the same effect—arguably to their detriment, which I will address 
later—others make no attempt to safeguard the audience from the effort behind the dance, 
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“shattering the illusion of ease and grace by the disruptive presence of fleshy 
experience—heavy breathing, sweat, technical mistakes, physical injury and even 
evidence of a dancer’s age or mortality” (Bryson 74). Though not every body is affected 
by illness, every single body ages, and every single body dies: and by making this fact 
visible, disabled dancers break the illusion that their bodies are abnormal—and remind 
audiences that the corporeal possibilities represented may come into anyone’s life at any 
given time. 
 By entering an arena that has typically shut them out, disabled dancers force a 
radical reconsideration of the binaries that excluded them in the first place. By identifying 
as both “disabled” and “dancer”—which in many cases, is a synonym for “able-
bodied”—disabled dancers “confuse non-disabled people’s concepts of what dance can 
be, what bodies are supposed to do, and what disability means” (Kuppers 68). They 
“deconstruct the polarization of ability and disability,” pointing out the falsity of that 
binary, and “challeng[ing] the prevailing vision of professional dance that equates 
physical ability with aesthetic quality” (Albright 57). Furthermore, when audience 
members observe dance of any kind, something called “metakinesis” occurs: according to 
John Martin, “inherent contagion of bodily movement” leads to “sympathy on a muscular 
level” (Albright xix). By sitting in proximity to the dancers, audience members begin to 
identify with their specific movement qualities, “kinesthetic reflexes and dynamic 
momentum” (Bull 283). Suddenly, the taboo is broken: one person’s corporeal 
experience becomes blurred, and the boundaries separating performer from audience 
member are problematized. Both disabled and non-disabled parties are encouraged to 
consider the wall that makes each an outsider to the other, and in doing so, may “find 
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[themselves] aligning…into new relations with them, relations that might not so easily be 
categorized as ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’” (Kuppers 3). 
 However, not all reactions to physically integrated dance have recognized its 
capacity. In 1994, dance critic Arlene Croce famously coined the term “victim art” in 
response to Bill T. Jones’s project Still/Here, which featured HIV/AIDS patients. 
Remarkably, without even watching the piece, Croce attacked it for its apparent 
inattention to the art of dance, saying it focused instead on the turmoil of living with 
terminal illness—falsely separating the two categories, and assuming that “people who 
are defined by their bodies are trapped by them” (Kuppers 53). The backlash against 
Croce was fervent, but the question remained: why did she react with such hostility? 
Albright would argue that the bodies reminded Croce of her own inevitable bodily 
failure, but that does not answer the larger question. Croce is by no means the only critic 
to tackle physically integrated dance, and the more receptive—but no less demeaning—
reaction is what Albright calls the “language of astonishment” (79). For example, when a 
critic watches a man dance without having any legs, they commend his physical and 
emotional feat with language that “reflects both an evangelistic awakening (yes, a 
disabled man can swagger!) and traces of a freak-show voyeurism (see the amazing feats 
of the man with no legs!)” (Albright 79). This approach prevents the art from being 
measured for its merit, and reinforces the divide between physically integrated dance and 
classical dance, which—besides presenting different aesthetics—share much more than 
the word dance in common. 
 Audiences do—or don’t—go to physically integrated performances for a variety 
of reasons; but when sexual and racial difference take the stage, Cohen’s theory of 
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“simultaneous repulsion and desire” (Cohen 6) becomes even more relevant toward 
analyzing audience motivations. In Embodying Difference, Jane Desmond explains why 
Anglo audiences gravitate toward dances that present sexual and racial “Others”: seated 
safely in the confines of a theatre, audience members are free to experience what is often 
considered a taboo and risqué way of moving in an arena that is “clearly delimited in time 
and space” (41). When the lights signal the end of the performance, everyone is free to go 
home, having gotten to temporarily inhabit an enticingly different world “without paying 
the social penalty” of actually being of that world (Desmond 37). In the case of 
physically integrated dance, then, why do audiences watch—if they watch at all? In 
addition to Martin’s theory of metakinesis and empathy that originates on a cellular level, 
many dance theorists have argued that audiences watch disabled dance out of a desire to 
feel better about their own ability—like a dance of sexual or racial provocation, dances of 
mixed abilities within an enclosed stage allow able-bodied audiences the chance to feel 
anything from pity to repulsion to desire, while still guaranteeing that they will walk out 
of the theatre back into a world that favors the able-bodied.  
What they do not count on, however, is the fact that disabled dancers are uniquely 
qualified to hold up a mirror to the audience’s own insecurities and feelings—the gaze is 
unexpectedly refracted back. Because the body is the site of our social histories, and 
because unlike sex or race (for the most part), the body we have will change and 
deteriorate in its ability over the course of a lifetime, the audience is given insight into 
their own reality. In physically integrated dance, the audience goes from watching to 
witnessing, “a kind of perceiving (with one’s whole body) that is committed to a process 
of mutual dialogue” (Albright xxii). Similar to the way that Mairs and Grealy imbue their 
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readers with the responsibility to reconsider dis/ability, physically integrated dance 
“raises the stakes of audience engagement”: oftentimes, making audiences uncomfortable 
and requiring them to stay with that discomfort in a meditation of obliterated binaries. 
Observation is turned into “more than a flat visual gaze,” and instead requires “attending 
to kinesthetic, aural, somatic, and spatial sensations” (Albright xix).  
This phenomenon is heightened even further when the proscenium stage, which 
creates a natural boundary between performer and observer is abandoned, as it is in 
Contact Improvisation (CI): suddenly, not only are the binaries between dis/abled and 
disabled/dancer complicated, but there is no safe observational space to settle into. In CI, 
the role of audience member becomes “obsolete”: it “pulls the audience in as witness to 
the ongoing negotiations of their [own] physical experience” (Albright 90, emphasis 
mine) in addition to the experiences unfolding around them. 
 
Contact Improvisation: Defiance, Dis-ease, and Expanding Definitions 
The body can relax, let go, take a vacation from trying so hard, or not at all…Follow 
your partner. Risk the road. Go down the untraveled paths of back or neck. Let bone 
graze bone. Fall into pools of flesh. Lounge in heat. Drink the elixir of expansion, the 
release within response…Let your body call you back into yourself, into your most deeply 
embodied self. Land, dive, soar. Find the crumbs that lead back home. 
- Cheryl Pallant, Contact Improvisation 
 
 Contact Improvisation is not of this world. At least, it is not of the dance world of 
ages past—the one that demands that a specific body enact specific movement, under 
specific circumstances of light and sound. As the above quotation, an introductory 
exercise to CI, indicates, Contact Improvisation is about following bodily sensations in a 
mutually dependent dialogue of weight-bearing and exploration of “the mystery of the 
unfolding movement, not doing, not action, not goal, not even the crafting of beauty” 
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(Pallant 87). Bodies of all shapes and sizes, all ability levels and all walks of life, are 
encouraged to “enter a mutually reflexive, living relationship with their surroundings” 
(27). CI pays tribute to the ever-changing process, the improvisational dialogue that 
places touch—physical and symbolic—at the forefront.  
 Contact Improvisation is a postmodern dance form based on a rolling point of 
physical contact between two (or more) dancers, who yield to the momentum of each 
other’s bodies to create a fluid exchange of weight. Certain elements of CI remain 
consistent, and the six principles that drive the movement—attitude, sensing time, 
orientation to space, orientation to partner, expanding peripheral vision, and muscular 
development—are at the forefront; however, what makes the form so effective is its 
slipperiness—its unwillingness to be “reduce[d] to a sound bite” (Pallant 74). Though 
Steve Paxton is credited with starting the form in 1972, he decided not to trademark the 
work, “preferring ongoing dialog instead” (14). Even today, as CI has gained popularity 
throughout the professional dance world and has permeated film, television, stage, and 
therapy sessions alike, “[Paxton] refuses to claim the terrain mapped out by CI as his 
own. He doesn’t command that only an elite few lead the Contact brigade” (Pallant 14). 
In stark contrast to ballet, which thrives on institutionalized distribution, codification, and 
certification, CI spreads primarily by word-of-mouth and collaborative “jam” sessions all 
over the world. In this way, it is much more than just another jewel in the crown of 
professional dance—the democratic nature of its founding was “an act with profound 
personal and societal implications” (Pallant 15).   
 Of all the dance forms that are—and are not—accommodating toward the full 
spectrum of dis/abled bodies, CI has a unique capacity for “hierarchical reshuffling” 
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(Pallant 80). For one, it is based on a mutual exchange of touch: there is no clear leader or 
follower, and the hierarchies surrounding ability, race, class, age, and sexuality melt 
away. In this “new world of equality,” 
…partners can examine given roles and opt to abandon them for a revised 
relationship…the dance acts as a pyre for burning unwelcome social debris and 
clearing space for a new social order based on mutual respect and equality. 
(Pallant 80) 
 
Because CI itself is a free-floating entity, the “stage for a new social order” (Pallant 82) 
that refuses to turn anyone away, every session can produce a partnership that might not 
otherwise occur—the elderly dance with the young, and someone of lower class may 
share weight with someone of high economic status, marking one of the “few occasions” 
where the two may interact “on equal footing” (82). By moving through space together in 
an environment that fosters trust, ideas of alienation or reckless autonomy—notions at the 
heart of American culture—disappear, encouraging awareness of the importance of 
touching and being touched. 
  Within a culture that “promotes individuality and its unintended byproduct, 
isolation” (Pallant 5), the act of touching is nothing short of momentous. For one, the 
type of gentle touch that CI solicits causes boundaries between partners to dissipate; it 
pokes holes in our armors of self-presentation, “quite literally, keep[ing] us in touch, 
allowing us to forge necessary connections between ourselves and the other” (97). In the 
case of a disabled body, which is constantly deemed the societal and corporeal Other, this 
connection has the potential to erase a lifetime of ignorant judgment. Secondly, touch 
spurs numerous health benefits: the simple connection of skin-to-skin has been linked to 
stress relief, the stimulation of the immune system, increased self-awareness, the 
generation of synaptic links, and profound shifts in energy (97). Drawing on the comment 
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of masseuse and Trager® practitioner Deane Juhan, who sees our society as “touch 
deprived and touch phobic, despite innumerable physical and psychological benefits” 
(96), I believe Contact is key to forming a more comprehensive treatment for physical 
ailments and disabilities.8 Especially in a CI setting, which denies that physical 
connection is solely sexual—reserved for intimate relations—and re-presents it as easy 
and natural, touch is a necessary step in the rehabilitation of the body and mind. Cheryl 
Pallant, avid dancer and author of Contact Improvisation, who was diagnosed with 
scoliosis as a young girl, internalized the judgments of others and segregated herself from 
the dance world until she discovered CI. Besides embracing her curved spine as simply 
one more facet of her identity, her physical contact with other bodies caused her back 
spasms to disappear, “the pain vanishing also in subsequent years” (2). Pallant is not the 
only one to credit CI as much more than a dance form, but also as a system of movement 
therapy; like the act of being disabled itself, it represents an amorphous, slippery category 
that impacts the mind and body in profound ways. 
 In CI, the mind and body are never separated: they are fused through the act of 
touch, and furthermore, through the bodily listening that the form demands. In it, 
“partners pay attention to the ongoing fluctuations of their bodies, from the obvious to the 
subtle…emotions assert and retreat, and memories emerge and recede, all spilling into 
movement sequences” (Pallant 32). The emotional history of each individual forms the 
basis for the movement itself, and likewise, “where the body goes, so too goes the mind” 
(100). Rather than asking participants to surrender their feelings at the door and mimic a 
                                                        
8 The Trager® Method incorporates fundamentals of body-mind integration into 
massage, using techniques of rocking, shaking, and stretching in order to release habitual 
tension in the body resulting from blocked energy in the mind. 
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codified recipe for aesthetic beauty, CI simply asks for surrender—the emotion is 
contained within the motion, “mind and body inextricably entwined” (17). For this 
reason, it is not only the ideal format for the physical therapy of bodies affected by 
illness, injury, or disability, but also an effective forum for those bodies to enter into the 
dance sphere because it treats the mindbody as a unit—and expands disability beyond its 
societal definition as a primarily physical issue. 
 Many times, at the beginning of a CI jam, participants will go around and list their 
individual needs—it is assumed that everyone, regardless of whether their “special need” 
is their paralyzed legs or their pending divorce, is dealing with specific physical and 
emotional burdens. Because CI recognizes ability as a “continuum and not as an either/or 
situation” (Pallant 87), it questions why visible disabilities are more culturally 
stigmatized. This contrasts greatly with ballet, which—in its delineation of bodily 
perfection as “the necessary prerequisite” (Bull 272)—has spurned a host of body image 
related issues, including a culture of severe eating disorders.9 Ballet companies are 
notoriously reluctant to acknowledge how deeply these psychological issues impact the 
physical, because their effects may not be visible to an audience; however, in CI, no such 
hiding is possible. When a dancer suffers from distorted body image, “only reluctantly do 
they lean into their partner…the contact remains tentative” (Pallant 51). Body image 
struggles will easily put a Contacter at greater disadvantage than one who may be 
“disabled,” but more comfortable with his or her own body as it is.  
                                                        
9 This issue, while not easily traceable to one source, has been the subject of intense 
media scrutiny. For further research, see Dancing On My Grave, by Gelsey Kirkland; and 
more recently, “The Light Fantastic? Ballet Dancers and Anorexia,” by Julia Mackrell 
(The Guardian, 6 February 2012). 
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To further complicate the issue of dis-ease in dance, as opposed to clinically 
diagnosed disease, oftentimes the technical virtuosity prized by classical dance forms can 
“obscure other qualities of [CI], like its ability to communicate or stumble into the realm 
of novelty and surprise” (Pallant 43). A body that is physically fit may also be 
“hardened,” demonstrating “little elasticity and receptivity,” leading to a “limited range 
of listening and motion” (Pallant 104). This negative description of the fit, able body flips 
the bias typically presented to us, especially in the dance world: it breaks the tether 
between disability and inability, proving the dichotomy is a false one. By the very nature 
of its process, CI shines new light on dis/ability studies by allowing people with physical 
limitations—many of whom “[speak] of trusting and loving their body as it [is]” (Linton 
63)—to emerge as more able than the bodies dealing with eating disorders or 
sexual/physical abuse, both of which are “intensely disabling” (62). Says Simi Linton, a 
disability rights activist and author:  
I think we need to develop a more complex and self-critical discussion of physical 
freedom in order to recognize that the ability to move—anywhere at anytime—
does not necessarily equal a true psychic liberty…[paralysis] isn’t necessarily any 
more personally disempowering than an experience of a body image disorder, 
even though only one of these people would be considered ‘disabled’ in our 
society. (63) 
 
Through her experience as a disabled woman and organizer of the Society for Disabled 
Studies Conference’s wildly popular dis/abled social dance, Linton knows that the only 
way to make change is to expand beyond a proscenium stage, and out of the movement 
vocabulary that has deemed dis/ability untranslatable to dance. And according to Pallant, 
“CI becomes the very vehicle for that change” (Pallant 51). 
 
(Broken) Body Language: A New Vocabulary 
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The problem with many physically integrated dance companies is that they 
attempt to conform to an aesthetic that has already been established, only with a different 
set of bodies—and the performance appears strained as a result. The aesthetic of ballet is 
exclusive to begin with, focused on “an ethereal presence rather than a real corporeality” 
(Wolff 95). Therefore, when someone attempts to wheel into the archetype, to fit into a 
narrow space that is unaccommodating to most bodies, the integrity of the disabled body 
and of the classical form itself are compromised. According to Linton, “if disabled 
dancers merely mimicked or recapitulated standard dance, albeit in alternative ways, we 
would not have an impact on the art form called dance” (Linton 152). The only way to do 
that is to abandon the old vocabulary altogether, and dance in a new language—one that 
is better communicated by a disabled body.  
More than any other dance form, Contact Improvisation facilitates this invention. 
For one, Contacters often purposefully work with so-called disabilities: in a jam, closing 
one’s eyes and making the legs “dead weight,” or simply deciding to work in an 
alternative plane of movement—on all fours, or with the entire body sprawled on the 
floor—is considered an opportunity, not a limitation. It is through these restrictions, 
especially lack of sight, that deeper bodily reflexes and possibilities are accessed—it 
leads to a heightened sensory awareness and a new way of looking at the world. Some 
disabled dancers have tapped into the specific beauty of their movement, presenting it as 
something to be desired; Bill Shannon, for example, uses his crutches to make a “highly 
sophisticated and complex action out of walking down a flight of stairs…developing this 
everyday action into a ballet of swoops and falls” (Kuppers 62). It may not be classical 
ballet, but it is ballet nonetheless—and the only physically integrated companies that 
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succeed in reframing disability in a positive way are the ones who choreograph using the 
extraordinary vocabulary exclusive to the bodies they are working with. 
Even with the best intentions in mind, many companies that feature disabled 
dancers—as opposed to CI, which is not compartmentalized into professional 
companies—do so in a way that is potentially insulting to both audience member and 
artist. One example is that of Cleveland Ballet Wheels, a well-received company that 
features Mary Verdi-Fletcher—a paraplegic—as one of its principal dancers. Verdi-
Fletcher, who was born with spina bifida, is praised for her dedication to bringing 
wheelchair dancing into the mainstream—but she does it by replicating the aesthetics that 
characterize that mainstream. She is described as having the “spark, the spirit” (Albright 
66) that make a dancer shine—but in the company’s choreography, this quality is 
emphasized instead of the unique movements available to her only because she is in a 
wheelchair. In one piece choreographed by Sabatino Verlezza, Verdi-Fletcher is lifted 
overhead by a male able-bodied dancer, waving her arms in a display of triumph—which 
“paradoxically reinforces, rather than disrupts, the negative connotations of disability” 
(Albright 65) by making it appear as though she must be hoisted into the position of 
“real’ dancer, one whose ‘spirit’ doesn’t let the limitations of her body get in the way” 
(66). It would be different if it were Verdi-Fletcher’s choreography, if she had agency in 
narrating her disability as she sees it—but as it is, CBW’s orientation of bodies on stage 
often “seems to invoke all the worst stereotypes of disability in a completely uncritical 
manner” (Albright 69). 
Light Motion, a Seattle-based company under the direction of Charlene Curtiss, 
edges more toward the disruption that Albright calls for; Curtiss maneuvers her 
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wheelchair as though it is an extension of her own body, “expanding its legibility as a 
signal of the handicapped into a sign of embodiment” (Albright 83). Even better, 
Candoco—based in London—utilizes innovative plays with momentum and level 
changes, exploring the ways that wheelchairs and legs may support and connect with one 
another. “The choreography refuses the implicit ideology of standing upright by placing 
most of the movement on the ground” (Albright 80). Still, despite the numerous ways that 
these companies are working toward revolutionizing perceptions of disability onstage, the 
fact remains that they are doing it on a stage—fencing in “innovations and disportments” 
that, according to Simi Linton, can “never quite ‘fit’ in the confines of a proscenium 
stage” (Linton 154).  
Where these companies attempt, Contact Improv achieves true progress—without 
even trying, or acknowledging that it is doing so. It does not make money or win 
audiences over based on a philanthropic presentation of bodies not typically seen—it 
simply gives all bodies the clean slate and lack of expectations required for creativity to 
bloom. Besides DV8, a mixed abilities dance company that uses film as a medium for 
disrupting the ableist gaze, CI represents a rare opportunity to break out of the boundaries 
automatically created by an elevated stage. Furthermore, by welcoming all abilities and 
acknowledging that disabilities are rooted in the psychological as well as physical, CI 
breaks the trend in physically integrated dance that caters to lower body paralysis—with 
no aesthetic to aspire toward, the wheelchair is given no more attention than less visible 
disabilities.  
This is particularly relevant next to physically integrated companies: for example, 
the GIMP project. Despite the many admirable traits of Latsky’s vision, when Helen 
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O’Neill reviewed the company in 2009, the main focus of her article inadvertently points 
out a critical trap: she praises the able-bodied dancers for overcoming their emotional 
setbacks, and the disabled dancers—apparently, more likely to present “raw emotional 
honesty” (O’Neill 3) because of their condition—for their struggle to keep up with the 
physicality of the dance. She writes that Jeffrey Freeze, a professional dancer before 
joining GIMP, was asked “what is YOUR risk?” by audience members—as if his life’s 
emotional and physical hardship would be less trying simply because he had two working 
legs. In contrast, Contact Improv treats the mind and body as a unit: all dancers are 
assumed to bring a level of emotional and physical vulnerability to the table, despite their 
societal position as dis/abled. CI gives space for a new language to develop, one that 
treats disability and dance in the same sentence—not as two worlds colliding. 
Language is an important forum to consider if real change is going to be made; 
especially considering that “all bodies are limited, disabled by language” (Kuppers 58). 
Of the plethora of bodily experiences—and identities determined by race, class, sexuality, 
ability, etc.—we are expected to be able to check the reality of our bodies off in a box 
that asks whether we are male or female; able or disable; Hispanic, black, or white. If 
that’s not debilitating, what is? Forging a new vocabulary that genuinely expands upon 
the particularities that the disabled body has to offer—and making that vocabulary visible 
through a medium that embraces it, like Contact Improv—proves that semantic labeling 
is not set in stone, and neither are the judgments behind them. Proving that language 
itself is a “ritual machine,” and that the “disabled body isn’t the raw matter preceding the 
fully arrived, evolutionary pinnacle of linguistically communicating ‘normal man’” (86), 
opens the floodgates of reconsideration: the way we treat dis/ability is constructed, not 
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innate. By redefining what qualifies as an acceptable body and beautiful movement, CI 
achieves this opening; and because “language…contains shortcomings, often proving 
imprecise in capturing the moment-to-moment challenges in movement and 
consciousness” (Pallant 4), CI relies on bodily communication. “In place of words, the 
close proximity of bodies sharing weight and skin, bony and soft surfaces, firm and slack 
muscles all provide an endless stream of information about the physical condition of the 
dancers and where the dance can go” (Pallant 22). In my experience, when CI partners 
attempt to consult verbally, it actually causes their muscles to tense in a way that hinders 
the dance. The social dominance of words is undermined, and in its place, the body is left 
to speak openly and honestly about its experience. 
By the very fact that they are physical, dance and movement have the ability to 
communicate in a way that “mere language cannot (yet)” (Kuppers 3); they fight the 
“ocularcentric society” that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson describes with their insistent 
visibility, with the fact that an audience may not so easily tune them out, or place them 
back on a shelf. We react instinctively to dance, and have bodily reactions to the 
moments that hit us at our core—the moments where pins and needles crawl up and down 
our spine—reinforcing the act of witnessing as a physical, not merely intellectual, 
experience. Dance is essential to my argument because it engages audiences beyond a 
one-dimensional stare, disrupting the notion of gaze altogether—including the male gaze. 
The female disabled dancer, by “radically question[ing] the ideal image of a dancer’s 
physique,” (Albright 57) has the power to fracture the male gaze where even the strongest 
body cannot. Furthermore, the act of jumping all over the stage—the tactic that Grealy 
and Mairs emulate in their texts by pluralizing identity and rejecting chronology, 
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respectively—physically represents the jumbled, nonlinear nature of life itself. Even 
better, a dancer in a wheelchair may evoke the fluid transition between the multiple 
identities inherent in each life by rolling across the stage; something that she is able to do, 
not in spite of her disability but because of it.  
According to Petra Kuppers, a life or a body that has encountered trauma is jolted 
into paralysis; the current of life is disrupted by an event that is a “moment out of flow” 
(Kuppers 104), which then repeats in one’s memory like a broken record. To move, 
then—to dance—represents a unique opportunity around this paralysis, a “flow of 
energy, and a way of being alive, that negates fixity” (1). It saves the narrative from 
being weighed down by the paralysis of trauma, whether that rigidity is physical or 
symbolic. In the case of the former—and the reason why dance is so relevant—“the 
ambiguous decision to perform one’s body,” to deny the fixity of corporeal trauma, 
“opens up new chapters for disability narratives—and for dance” (Kuppers 68). 
Furthermore, because disabled bodies are often treated with overt delicacy—like 
“precious, breakable doll[s]” (Mintz 15)—the act of dancing, and throwing one’s body 
around with all the momentum and immediacy that it craves, obliterates the stigma by 
proving that they do not break. 
 
 
Synergy and In[ter]dependence 
The written word is not an indisputable authority in relaying the twists and turns 
inherent in embodiment; however, there are many writers—and Lucy Grealy is among 
them—who make their words dance, and construct their texts in a way that captures the 
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movement of storytelling. As I have shown, by the sporadic nature of her storytelling and 
the “ease” with which she “slip[s] in and out of her various persona” (Grealy 38), Grealy 
captures the motion inherent in the decidedly un-unified experience of being alive and 
demonstrates how the “‘truth’ of particular bodies is open to revision” (Mintz 68). If her 
life story were to be captured in dance, it would be a Contact Improvisation. For one, she 
reflects upon the singular and “fleeting…nature of all moments,” (Grealy 86) which is 
fundamental to any improvisational form. In CI, all movements are understood on this 
basis; the “smooth or bumpy course of the dance” is given room to unfold because 
dancers are encouraged to meditate on the fact that circumstances are constantly 
shifting—“it’s just that some motion is more visible and active than others” (Pallant 48). 
CI leaves no room for anticipation, which is particularly relevant considering Grealy’s 
relationship to time: despite her awareness of the present moment, she consistently 
“postpones happiness until the next operation,” (Grealy 187) and admits that the physical 
pain of chemotherapy worsened when she knew what to expect (82). Disability and 
illness serve as magnifying glasses on the minute changes always taking place inside the 
body; but ironically, the pain within them can also foster a warped sense of anticipatory 
dread. CI presents a way of negotiating this paradox, and remaining centered in a world 
that is constantly morphing by engaging in a dance that is similarly unpredictable. 
As I described in chapter two, Grealy’s text demonstrates the multiple roles that 
she embodies throughout her life, both related and unrelated to her illness. She reflects on 
this fact, embraces it, and—though she fixates on the turmoil of her face—acknowledges 
that it changes so frequently that she “never had time to become acquainted” (Grealy 
221) with anything other than its constant change. As a medium, dance is open to 
 80
multiplicity by the very fact that it places bodies in motion, but by cutting out the 
anticipatory rise and fall of narrative, Contact Improv is the most receptive to plurality of 
identity. By engaging participants in the mutable nature of their surroundings, the 
pressure to conform to one label disappears: “Whether we identify ourselves as Son, 
Mother, Dancer, Student, Frail, Charming, or Difficult, the dance floor reveals identities 
as mutable and as varied as the dance” (Pallant 67). All bodies, not just disabled ones, are 
constantly shifting; and though one card of identity may be shuffled to the top of the 
deck, it does not change the fact that a host of experiences and selves exist beneath it. By 
allowing space for these identities to ebb and flow, CI “provides a concretely irrefutable 
experience of a connection to something beyond our singularity” (Pallant 114)—both 
within ourselves and in relation to the world around us. 
CI does more than encourage touch, it demands it: the exchange of weight sparks 
a domino effect, which “reinforces compassion by revealing how every action carries 
repercussions, repercussions that are conjoined” (Pallant 91). Grealy is no stranger to this 
effect; after all, it is a collision with another student during a kickball game—a blow that 
knocks her “into the present, the unmistakable now” (Grealy 14)—that sets the chain of 
events into motion that leads to her diagnosis. She muses on the idea of human touch 
with frequency, realizing that “part of the job of being human is to consistently 
underestimate our effect on other people” (65); but in CI, no such underestimation is 
possible. When two people share weight, no matter how steeled one partner may appear, 
he or she will inevitably move under the influence of another body. “Such a relationship 
cannot be taken lightly…when a hip bone presses into our flesh or hair flies in our faces, 
the stimuli compels acknowledgment and response” (Pallant 103). Though she struggles 
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to understand her place in relation to others, Grealy states that human touch “was akin to 
surrender, the closest I ever got to experiencing trust” (Grealy 153)—a fact best 
demonstrated by her friendship with Patchett. The synergy between the two is 
fundamental to their existence; and like CI, demonstrates that independence is found 
within interdependence.10 
First and foremost, CI is a process of sharing weight; at any given moment, one is 
both receiving and giving. The dance ceases to exist otherwise. One of the most popular 
introductory exercises asks partners to stand back-to-back, distributing mass evenly 
through the shared surface area, and to walk out slowly until both are sitting on the floor. 
Like most CI exercises, “every weight shift, movement, and psychological state directly 
impacts a partner…one finds standing possible only if the partner offers a stable surface” 
(Pallant 39). This interdependence is the backbone of the dance, and the most significant 
metaphor that can be gleaned from it: each movement directly impacts another person, 
“without the presence of competition and struggle for dominance”: which in our culture, 
is a “rare dynamic” (86). Like Grealy and Patchett, who lift and lean on each other in a 
cycle—through life and through text—that keeps them on equal footing, CI works only if 
partners are on equal footing—it is what keeps them, quite literally, from falling to the 
floor. On a spiritual level, CI fosters the Buddhist notion of interconnectedness: “it’s 
about finding a balance…without sacrificing individual differences” (Pallant 85). Though 
one is responsible for the safety of another, the strength to support them “lies primarily 
within oneself” (Pallant 4): proving that independence is actually interrelatedness, 
harnessed by dialogue “where seemingly individual energies emerge and merge to create 
                                                        
10 Both theoretically, as I have attempted to demonstrate, and on a semantic level as well: 
“interdependence.” 
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a flow greater than any one person” (Pallant 87). The disabled and ill are not the only 
ones dependent on others; even when we are able to take our own pills, take out our own 
garbage, or sit upright without the aid of another person, we are each and every one of us 
reliant on others. CI is merely a physical reminder, a visual aid for acknowledging the 
fact that it is possible to be “fully absorbed” in ourselves, “but also, paradoxically, each 
other” (Pallant 116). 
It sounds simple, but for many, interdependency is an inconvenient truth. For one, 
it destabilizes theories of feminism that claim the only empowered woman is one who is 
alone: not dependent on a man, not dependent on anyone but herself. This may have been 
a necessary stance to take in generations past, but it conflicts with another feminist train 
of thought—the one that “values all and demeans none” (Pallant 84). Feminism has “only 
relatively recently started to acknowledge disability as an important area of difference 
within its ranks” (Kuppers 50) because disability presents a problem for the connection 
between isolation and independence. Like the “fear of contagion” that disabled dancers 
provoke in audiences, or “the fear that the visible presence of someone else’s ‘large, 
aging, and dimpled thighs’ will unloose one’s own” (Albright 91), the disabled body 
reminds the world that everyone is dependent on others at some point. Every body 
deteriorates and every body ages. Contact Improv, by placing a full range of abilities 
together without labeling them—and requiring those bodies to physically lean on one 
another—breaks the false idea that, because they are outwardly reliant on others, disabled 
people are weak. 
Far from perfect, CI is not without weaknesses that make it appealing to some and 
not to others; for example, despite the fact that it refuses to pinpoint any aesthetic as 
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being better than another, my experience with the dance has taught me that it is difficult 
to regulate this value. Inevitably, certain participants will prize some techniques—fluid 
transition between movements, for example—and feel less capable if they are unable to 
emulate it. Furthermore, like any physical activity that requires inversion and 
unpredictability, participants are put at risk of injury. However, the limitations of CI are 
overwhelmed by its strengths: over time, participants acquire the skills they believed to 
be unreachable—and it almost always comes as a result of releasing in the mind, 
unclenching from an ideal, and letting the body react organically to the movement of 
others. This constructive reliance is what separates CI from narrative-based dances—
those it does not seek to compete with, nor replace—and is what makes it relevant to 
theories of autobiography that posit the self as a community-based identity (Smith and 
Watson 278). CI expands the notion of what it means to be disabled and what it means to 
be a woman; it is possible to rely on another without being needy, and it is possible to be 
needed without being a caregiver. Weight must be given in order to be taken.  
 
A Fair Share of Space 
The disabled body plays a unique role in the performance world because it is 
often considered to be “transparent:” it is typically associated with the visible, physical 
body, from which one can never separate, and “it functions as a master sign in our 
culture” (Kuppers 54) as a result. Whereas other categories of identity may be 
appropriated or shed, disability is commonly associated with the physical body—and how 
can a physical handicap be taken on or off? It cannot; however, it is not impossible to 
perform disability. This is a restoration of agency, an expansion upon what Luce Irigaray 
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calls “mimesis,” or subversion through a purposeful appropriation of characteristics 
associated with identity categories. Like Butler, Irigaray says that for a disabled woman 
“to play with mimesis” is to “recover the place of her exploitation by discourse…so as to 
make visible, by an effect of playful repetition, what was supposed to remain invisible” 
(Kozel 102). Just as Mairs momentarily fools a doctor with her appropriation of “abled,” 
performance of dis/ability—especially in Contact Improv, where ability is understood to 
exist on a spectrum—demands that the abnormal body have a place both onstage and off. 
Often, the lack of privacy created by constant medical treatment and social gawking has 
“undermined many [disabled] people’s ability to be confident in their use of space” 
(Kuppers 125); so to dance, to let one’s physical body take more than its fair share of 
space, is an act of empowerment. 
Is it possible for the disabled to perform ability? If it means a paraplegic bounding 
out of a wheelchair and running a marathon, only to shout “Gotcha!” at the end of the 
race, the answer is always going to be no. However, disability is not always visible—and 
the qualities of able-bodiedness may be appropriated and subverted. “Art is, for many 
readers”—and audience members—“an enabling concept” (McRobbie 230); so when 
artists intentionally disable an able-bodied audience, showing them that that their 
identities may be tried on and discarded, the dis/abled hierarchy is blown skyward—
leaving empty space in its wake, a blank slate for a new vocabulary to emerge. Dance, a 
medium that “insists on changes in location, on moving through spaces” (Albright 133), 
represents the frame; and Contact Improv, by insisting on the present moment, and 
embracing the “sticky web of identifications” (Albright 133) inherent in each body, is the 
canvas. CI paves the way for a new type of math equation: just as being disabled and 
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being a woman does not necessitate identification as a disabled woman, in CI, one body 
plus one body does not equal two: there is always the third entity, the mystery of the 
“elemental tie” that emerges in the “tangible presence of another” (Pallant 102), that 
keeps it one step ahead of any language that threatens to limit it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Moment[um] 
 
 
 As Emma Goldman once said, “If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be part of your 
revolution.” In this thesis, I have argued that dance—with bodies or with words—is much 
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more than a perfect pirouette, or defiance of corporeality. In Contact Improv, reality is 
the backbone of the revolution that Goldman calls for: regardless of body type or 
dis/ability, dancers are encouraged to give more weight—to lower the center of gravity—
in order stay grounded, and to remain connected to the authenticity of individual shapes. 
For bodies that have historically been marginalized, to dance—to take up space, whether 
on the cool marley of a dance studio or the blank pages of a book—is to stake claim to 
territory that has typically excluded them. It brings the social powers forming that 
exclusion into question: why have certain bodies been prized, certain ways of moving 
given more value, and what fears are those judgments covering up? When the dis/abled 
perform the stories of their bodies, it makes able-bodied audiences aware of their 
simultaneous sameness and difference; it reminds them of their own organic, fallible 
bodies, and breaks the stigma surrounding dis/abled “Otherness.” In the case of CI, 
participants—dis/abled or not—are brought into physical proximity with another, sharing 
weight in a mutual dialogue until the definition of that Otherness is as blurry as the dance 
itself.     
Dis/ability and illness, arguably more so than any other identity category, have 
been associated with lack of authority: those bodies so “marked” (Ferris 91) are unable to 
shift in and out of their physical ailments. However, as I have demonstrated, the 
liberating forums of life writing and Contact Improv provide space for performance, both 
portrayal of able-bodiedness and articulation of disability-specific vocabulary, which 
radically question any binaristic definition of dis/ability. In keeping with all bodily 
processes, the experience of being dis/abled is constantly changing, and can be 
effectively represented through mediums that are themselves continually morphing. Both 
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Grealy and Mairs utilize the flexible forum of life writing to shift in and out of their 
multiple identities; denying the fixity of the “self’ in autobiography and challenging the 
fixity of disability and illness as a societal label. Though intensely personal, both writers 
seamlessly incorporate their corporeal struggles into the rest of the trials and tribulations 
of their daily lives—thus reaching out to audiences, and refusing to essentialize what is 
often considered a radically specific experience. Furthermore, their discussion of dis-ease 
and depression challenges the societal hierarchy that posits physical ailments as most 
debilitating. This interrelationship between body and mind—as well as the 
interdependency each writer engages in—is what bridges them to CI, which I believe is a 
comprehensive tool toward the articulation, and rehabilitation, of the body-mind unit. 
At times, the fundamentals of Contact have made their way into official 
rehabilitative services. Professor Janet Hamburg used the Bartenieff Fundamentals—a 
branch of Laban Movement Analysis,11 a technique very similar to CI in its philosophy 
and practice—to develop a system called “Motivating Moves for People With 
Parkinson’s.” The system is a series of simple exercises and visualizations that target the 
basal ganglia area of the brain, the center that controls movement, and has had 
remarkable success in getting Parkinson’s patients “unstuck” from frozen moments. This 
is merely one demonstration of how, when the ailment is pscycho-physical—as ailment 
always is—the treatment must be comprehensive as well. However, even when the 
impetus is not strictly “rehabilitative,” the philosophy and practice contained in CI 
addresses holding patterns in the body and mind in a way that is true to their mutually 
informing relationship. 
                                                        
11
 Created by Rudolph Laban, LMA is a system for describing, interpreting, and notating 
patterns of movement based on four categories of analysis: body, shape, effort, and space.  
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I have argued that dancing holds potential for expression where mere words 
cannot go, engaging audiences in physical as well as visual manner; however, the 
language of the body and a body of language are not separate universes. Rather, to look at 
writing and dance together as an “intratext” is the only way to capture the full range of 
experience. Just as the act of writing cannot be separated from the physical body that 
takes pen to paper, the reflective self can never be taken out of dance—and Contact 
Improv, by abandoning clean-cut endings in favor of the emergence of individual stories, 
is the ideal forum for this overlap.  
Occasionally, CI does incorporate narrative: during one improvisation class, my 
peers and I were led through an exercise that combined dance and writing in a manner 
more significant than anything I have ever encountered. First, we were given five minutes 
to write a memory of a place—any place—with the only requirement being to let our 
words flow without second-guessing them. Secondly, we were asked to find a partner; 
and together, after reading our separate memories, to engage in an improvisational dance 
that revealed the similarities between our remembered experiences. Each person 
memorized one or two lines of his or her own text to recite out loud; and the final product 
was a stunning physical, and verbal, dialogue that captured the interrelatedness within our 
independent experiences. Having necessarily only touched on the vast existing literature 
on dis/ability, autobiography, and dance, I know better than to believe that I can provide 
an answer to what is a complex and highly sensitive area of study; however, I believe that 
the above exercise provides a vital suggestion. The interdisciplinary dialogue between 
writing and dance—much like my stance in the Humanities major, and my impetus for 
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taking on this project—presents an opportunity for understanding one’s own body, and 
those that may seem different, in a way that enriches fluency in both disciplines. 
Without a doubt, the best part of this project has been the chance to experience, 
not only theorize, Contact. For the past few months, I have participated in twice-weekly 
CI classes with a group of students who, like myself, were completely new to the form. 
While no one in the group identifies as physically disabled, the wide range of physical 
and emotional experiences made each session—and each partnership—an exercise in 
listening to individual strengths and weaknesses. Those of us who entered the room with 
considerable dance experience were no better off than someone without it; no amount of 
physical preparation can cushion the profoundly vulnerable act of giving, and taking, 
weight. At one point, simply cradling another’s head in my hands—and feeling the 
moment when she registered the trust that my presence provided—allowed my body to 
yield to the floor in a way that hadn’t previously been accessible. As I continue to engage 
with the literature on CI, I am proud to say that my personal experience with the form has 
reinforced my belief in its potential: for disabled bodies, yes, but for all bodies equally. 
As one acquaintance told me, herself a cancer survivor, “Contact Improv is, of all the 
types of dance I’ve done, the best metaphor for life.” You lean, you take, you learn. 
There is nothing but the present, the moment[um] that each dialogue creates, to carry 
from one moment to the next. 
“Disability describes a condition that rests both in identity and in a complex set of 
social relations that can affect many people, if not all, in sentient life” (Crutchfield & 
Epstein 9)—so why are dis/ability studies not considered an essential part of every 
collegiate curriculum? Why, when we at the Claremont Colleges receive notification of a 
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“Developing Allies Workshop,” is ability not listed as one of the categories that delineate 
privilege? In the future, it is my hope that dis/ability will be understood as a topic that 
affects everyone, not only those who identify as disabled; and that by engaging in 
activities that treat the mind and body holistically, issues surrounding body image and 
disabling dis-ease will be given due attention as well. Though language limits the body, 
like dis/ability itself, words are ambivalent: the same movement that may be deemed 
unnatural may also be a movement, a radical mobilization of people demanding political 
change. The potential for transformation rests in the hands—and feet, and wheels—of 
those willing to realize that dis/ability does not exist in a binary, and that the vocabulary 
created by marginalized bodies, besides being moving (poignant, touching), writes an 
imperative word in the text of embodiment. All one has to do is read it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited  
 
Albright, Ann Cooper. Choreographing Difference: the Body and Identity in 
     Contemporary Dance. [Middletown, Conn.]: Wesleyan UP, 1997. Print. 
Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome. Monster Theory: Reading Culture. Minneapolis, MN: University 
 91
     of Minnesota, 1996. Print. 
Crutchfield, Susan, and Marcy Epstein. Introduction. Points of Contact: Disability, Art, 
     and Culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2000. 1-20. Print. 
Desmond, Jane C., Norman Bryson, Janet Wolff, Angela McRobbie, Cynthia Bull, Susan 
     Kozel. Desmond, Jane C., ed. Meaning in Motion: New Cultural Studies of Dance. 
     Durham: Duke UP, 1997. Print.  
Grealy, Lucy. Autobiography of a Face. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994. Print.  
 
Kuppers, Petra. Disability and Contemporary Performance: Bodies on Edge. New York:  
 
     Routledge, 2004. Print. 
 
LaMothe, Kimerer. "What a Body Knows: To Dance Is a Radical Act." Psychology 
     Today 29 Nov. 2011. Web. 
Linton, Simi. My Body Politic: a Memoir. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2006. 
     Print. 
Mairs, Nancy. Plaintext: Essays. Tucson: University of Arizona, 1986. Print. 
McRuer, Robert. Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability. New York: 
     New York UP, 2006. Print.  
Mintz, Susannah B. Unruly Bodies: Life Writing by Women with Disabilities. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, 2007. Print. 
 
O'Neill, Helen. "Brandishing Unique Bodies, Dance Troupe Triumphs." Associated Press 
     [New York] 17 May 2009. Print. 
Pafunda, Danielle, Cynthia Hogue, and Jim Ferris. Beauty Is a Verb: The New    
     Poetry of Disability. Ed. Jennifer Bartlett, Sheila Black, and Michael Northen. El 
 92
     Paso, TX: Cinco Puntos, 2011. Print. 
Pallant, Cheryl. Contact Improvisation: An Introduction to a Vitalizing Dance Form. 
     Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006. Print. 
Patchett, Ann. Truth & Beauty: a Friendship. New York: Harper Perennial, 2004. Print.  
Samuels, Ellen. "Critical Divides: Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question of 
     Disability." NWSA Journal 14.3 (2002): 58-76. JSTOR. Web. 16 Nov. 2011. 
Shakespeare, Tom. "The Social Model of Disability." The Disability Studies Reader. Ed.  
 
     Lennard J. Davis. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2006. 197-204. Print. 
 
Siebers, Tobin. "Disability and the Aesthetics of Human Disqualification." Performing   
     the Body Politic: Transgressions, Interventions, and Expressive Culture. Garrison 
     Theatre, Claremont, CA. 25 Oct. 2011. Lecture. 
Smith, Sidonie, and Julia Watson. Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life 
     Narratives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001. Print. 
 
 
 
